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ARTICLES
The Innovative German Approach to
Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German
Law, and Surprising Lessons for the
United States
Jason J.Kllborn"
Who would have thought that consumer bankruptcy1 law could offer a
solution to Germany's thirty-year slow decline in population? 2 Perhaps
"solution" is overly optimistic, but the true story of "the first Frankfurt
insolvency baby" is heartening if not prognostic. A young German couple
visited a debt counselor in Frankfurt in early 2001. The pair were "very
beaten down," the debt counselor reported, as a huge debt hung over their
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center. I
offer my sincerest thanks to Irene Di Maio, who taught me German for Reading
Understanding last summer and without whose help this Article would not have been
possible. I would also like to thank Paul Baier, Margaret Howard, Julie Kilbom, Pat Martin,
Nancy Rapoport, and Jay Westbrook for their comments on this article, as well as Chancellor
John Costonis for his generous research support. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations
of German materials are the author's.
Throughout this article, the words "bankruptcy," "insolvency," and "debt relief' are
used interchangeably. Despite the technical distinctions among these words, the basic
concept-using the law to assist consumers in debt over their heads-remains the same.
U.S. law tends to use the word "consumer bankruptcy" more often, while German law uses
the term "consumer insolvency." See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text for a
discussion of why Europeans eschew the U.S. terminology.
2 "The population of indigenous Germans has been in decline since 1972 in the west and
since 1969 in the east because the number of births has not kept pace with the number of
deaths." U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GERMANY-A COUNTRY STUDY, Population (1995),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html; see also U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Fact Book 2003, Germany, People, available at http://www.odci.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/gm.html#People (last visited Jul. 16, 2003) (reporting a birth
rate of 8.99 per 1000 and a death rate of 10.36 per 1000, producing negative population
growth were it not for immigration of non-German peoples).
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heads. This debt plagued the young couple especially, as they wanted
nothing more in this world than a baby, but they had decided not to start a
family for fear of burdening their child with a life hounded by collection
agents. Luckily, the debt counselor was able to recommend a new law that
would offer the would-be parents and their future child relief from their
debts. In 1999, for the first time in German history, a new law had gone
into effect in Germany that offered overburdened consumer debtors hope
for a new life without debt. The debt counselor explained that the young
family could erase their unpaid debts by agreeing to give up a small portion
of their income over several years. Indeed, the law would require them to
give up substantially less than they had already been paying to creditors up
to that point. The couple could hardly believe it! After a bit more
conversation about the new law, they began for the first time to smile, then
to laugh, and finally they smiled at each other and raced out of the office.
Nine months later, a new baby arrived in Frankfurt. "Without this
counseling session, this child would never have been born,"
the debt
3
counselor beamed. "She is thus really a true insolvency-baby!",
Whether or not the new law has the potential to reverse German
population contraction, the Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung)4 offers an
excellent opportunity for comparative legal analysis. U.S. consumer
bankruptcy reformers have wrangled for years over provisions very similar
to those implemented in the new German law. Most notably, intense debate
has surrounded proposals in the United States to require multi-year payment
plans for all debtors. 5 As the young Frankfurt couple learned, German law
requires multi-year payment terms as a prerequisite for consumer debt
relief. Nonetheless, a significant gulf separates the theory of this law from
the reality of the demands it places on German debtors and the benefits it
offers creditors. Careful analysis of the German consumer debt relief
system reveals much more nuanced, enlightening, and perhaps surprising
3 See CLAUS TRIEBIGER, DAS 1. FRANKFURTER INSOLVENZBABY IST DA!, at http://
www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de/inso/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2004)(on file with author).
4 INSOLVENZORDNUNG [INSOLVENCY ACT] VOM 5. OKTOBER 1994 (BGBl. I 2866)
[hereinafter INSO]. The Insolvenzordnung, made effective January 1, 1999, has been
amended numerous times since its passage in 1994. The best place to find an up-to-date
version of the law is online. For an English translation, I recommend the Ministry of
Justice's version as of January 1, 2002, at http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/l1317.pdf (last
visited Jul. 9, 2003). For the German version, I recommend the up-to-date version at http://
www.inso-rechtspfleger.de/inhalt/04_materialien/insotext/indexa.html (last visited Jul. 9,
2003).
5 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 107-617, at 5-20 (2002); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of

Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 12-34 (2001); Kenneth N.

Klee, RestructuringIndividual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 436-41 (1997); Michelle J.
White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A CriticalLook at the Incentives Under U.S.
Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U. CH. L. REV. 685, 710-16

(1998).
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results than simple comparison of the U.S. and German consumer debt
relief laws. Given the similarity in social and economic conditions in
Germany and the United States, a look at how the new German law has
developed in practice offers significant insight into the potential benefits
and pitfalls of implementing a similar system in the United States.
This Article seeks to achieve two goals as it describes the consumer
provisions of the new German Insolvency Act. First, it reveals critical
distinctions between the theory of consumer insolvency, as described in
German law and legal literature, and the reality of consumer insolvency in
practice, as it has developed in the four-and-a-half years since the law went
into effect. From both theoretical and practical perspectives, the German
experience both supports and challenges many of the notions underlying
consumer bankruptcy reform debates in the United States. As it turns out,
the German and U.S. consumer debt relief systems produce largely the
same economic results. At the same time, however, the German system
includes important elements lacking in the United States, and it focuses on
achieving important societal goals that U.S. law neglects.
Second, this Article provides access to a wide variety of legislative
material and legal commentary on the new German consumer insolvency
law that has been neither translated nor discussed in English. I hope the
dissemination of easily accessible internet-based sources describing the
theory, history, structure, and practice of German consumer debt relief law,
as well as commentary on these sources in English, will add another
productive dimension to U.S. academic and legislative debate on consumer
bankruptcy reform. U.S. legislators ignored European approaches to
insolvency law when they revamped the U.S. bankruptcy law in the 1970s,
because so little was known about how European laws worked in practice. 6
Today, improved transatlantic communication and the internet open up a
wealth of information on current European insolvency processes.
Europeans have studied and learned from U.S. bankruptcy law. Now we in
the United States can and should learn from the innovative, thoughtful, and
modern European approaches to relieving financially troubled consumers.
Part II of this Article explores the circumstances leading to consumer
debt relief reform in Germany. It first reports statistics on the sources and
volume of rising consumer indebtedness in Germany in the 1980s and
1990s. Then it surveys the deficiencies among the various legal protections
6

See

COMMISsION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE

H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at
66(1973).
7 See generally Nick Huls, American Influences on European Consumer Bankruptcy
Law, 15 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 125 (1992) [hereinafter Huls, American Influences]; see also
infra note 70 (describing a special meeting initiated by the Law Committee of the
Bundestag, or lower house of the German Parliament, with U.S. bankruptcy experts to
discuss the shape of the future German insolvency law).
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
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available to overburdened consumer debtors before the Insolvency Act went
into force in 1999. Part III describes the German solution to the problem of
rising consumer overindebtedness. It lays out the history and structure of
the consumer-oriented provisions of the Insolvency Act, with special
emphasis on the practical operation and reform of the new law over the first
few years of its existence. Part III pays particular attention to the
development of the multi-year payment obligation as a prerequisite for a
discharge of unpaid debt. Part IV extracts three lessons for U.S. law reform
based on the German experience. This Part focuses on the critical and
perhaps surprising disconnect between theory and reality in the German
law, as well as the implications of that disconnect for U.S. law reformers.
Finally, Part V distills the German system to its essence, pointing out that
the current U.S. and German systems of consumer debt relief are not very
different in practice. Nonetheless, the fundamental distinction between the
goals and effects of the two systems contains a final crucial lesson for the
United States.
II.

THE BLEAK SITUATION FOR GERMAN CONSUMER DEBTORS BEFORE
1999: RISING DEBT LOADS, INEFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY LAWS, AND
INSUFFICIENT PROPERTY PROTECTIONS

The number of Germans facing serious debt problems rose drastically
in the 1980s and 1990S.8 The volume of consumer credit-as well as the
percentage of households taking on consumer debt-grew in Germany at an
explosive rate following World War II, especially from 1968 onward. 9 A
study commissioned to investigate the growing problem of excessive debt
in Germany estimated that, in 1989, 1.2 million households--over 3% of
the total number of householdsl'°-suffered from excessive debt." While
8 See, e.g.,
GESETZENTWURF
DER BUNDESREGIERUNG:
ENTWURF
EINER
INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INSO), BUNDESIRATS-DRUCKSACHE [BR-DR.] 1/92, at 82 (Jan. 3,
1992),
available
at
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/
show dok.pl?k=BBD1/92 (last visited Jul. 18, 2003).
9 See Knut Holzscheck, Konsumentenkreditaufnahme und Verbraucherverschuldung in
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in VERBRAUCHERKREDIT UND VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ:
PERSPEKTIVEN FOR DIE RECHTSPOLITIK AUS EUROPA uND USA 66 (1986). Total consumer
credit volume grew from less than 10 billion DM in 1967 to nearly 160 billion DM in 1984.
Id. at tbl. 1. To place this growth in context, the ratio of the total volume of consumer credit
to the gross national product had risen from 0.2% in the late 1940s to 10% in 1984. Id.
1oSee STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT, BEVOLKERUNG: HAUSHALTSTYPEN (2003), availableat
http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/bevoe/bevoetabl 1.htm (last visited Jul. 22, 2003) (reporting
just over 38 million households in 2000, with a growth rate of about 300,000 households per
year, suggesting about 35 million in 1989).
11See DIETER KORCZAK & GABRIELA PFEFFERKORN, UBERSCHULDUNGSSITUATION UND
SCHULDNERBERATUNG INDER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND XL (1992); see also id at 23112 for a general overview of the consumer credit situation in Germany in 1990. By May
1999, the number of over-indebted households had more than doubled to 2.8 million by

260

The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief
24:257 (2004)
the median income grew only twelve-fold between 1950 and 1984, per'2
capita indebtedness increased more than 800-fold during the same period.
Credit card usage remained quite low,' 3 but Germans nonetheless
incurred substantial debts, primarily through installment loans from finance
companies and banks, as well as credit purchases from mail order
companies. 14 Germans commonly took on debt to purchase furniture and
other household items, as well as automobiles.' 5 Most troubling, a very
large portion of consumer debt was incurred to pay off previous installment
debt, leading many consumers into a vicious cycle of "chain
indebtedness."' 6 Credit deregulation in the 1980s further accelerated the
growth of consumer debt. Total consumer debt in Germany more than
doubled again between 1984 and 1994, from just under DM 160 billion in
1984 to almost DM 364 billion in 1994.17 Job loss and other unexpected

stress on income' 8 would throw the already sensitive economics of heavily

some estimates. See GP-FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE, VERSCHULDUNG UND U0BERSCHULDUNG
(2003), http://gp-forschungsgruppe.com/de/tf ver.asp (last visited Jul. 8, 2003). The total
number of households has grown to just under 39 million, see STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT,
supra note 11 (which means that over 7% of households are overindebted in Germany
today).
12 DETLEF BONNEMANN & THOMAS RICKAL, EINFUHRUNG IN DEN PROBLEMKREIS VER-/

OBERSCHULDUNG

§ 1 (1997),

available at http://www.uni-essen.de/tts/lehrangebot/

verschuldung/schulden.pdf (last visited Jul. 2, 2003).
13Estimates suggested that only 7.1% of the German population used credit cards by
1990. See KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 78-82, 272 tbl. 38.
" See id., at 52, 272 tbl. 38. Moderate-interest loans from banks are far more difficult for
consumers to obtain than loans from finance companies and other credit suppliers, which
leads a great many consumers to take on more expensive and riskier loans from finance

companies and "shadier" lenders. See, e.g., Holzcheck, supra note 10, at 74-75.
15See Holzcheck, supra note 9, at 70; KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 106,
272-73. The usage and structure of German consumer credit at the end of the 1980s was in

many ways quite similar to consumer credit use in the United States in the early- to mid1900s.

See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF

CONSUMER CREDIT 183-208 (1999).
16 See Holzcheck, supra note 9, at 71-73, 78-79; KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note
11, at 273.
17See LARS RATH, UBERSCHULDUNG UND SCHULDNERBERATUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND UNTER

BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER NEUEN INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INSO) § 2.2 (1996),
available at http://www.fh-fulda.de/fb/sw/diplarb/rath/diplinso.html (last visited Jul. 7,
2003).
18Unemployment grew significantly in Germany in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
job loss is consistently cited among the most common reasons for consumer insolvency in
Germany. See, e.g., RATH, Id. at §§ 2.5, 3.1; CURT WOLFGANG HERGENRODER, SCHULDEN
OHNE ENDE ODER ENDE OHNE SCHULDEN? §VII (2001), available at www.sfz-mainz.de/
(last visited Jul. 9, 2003);
dateien/abhandlunen/antristtsvorlesunghergenroeder.htm
Holzscheck, supra note 9, at 76-77; EMPFEHLUNGEN DER AUSSCHOSSE ZUM ENTWURF EINTER
INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INso), BR-DR. 1/1/92, at 55 (Feb. 4, 1992), available at http://
www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/showdok.pl?k=BBD1/92 (last visited Jul. 18,
2003).
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indebted consumers into a tailspin.
German insolvency laws were unable to meet the challenges of this
rising tide of consumer debt. Unlike the bankruptcy regimes of many
European countries, German bankruptcy law has historically drawn no
distinctions between consumers and "merchants."' 9 Anyone could take
advantage of the two German laws dealing with debt relief. Under the
Konkursordnung,20 the debtor's assets were liquidated to produce a
distribution to creditors, while the Vergleichsordnung2 I sought to foster
renegotiation of debtor-creditor relations by majority vote of creditors.
Although both of these laws were technically available to consumers,
neither generally offered consumers any benefit. These two laws were
either practically unavailable or ineffectual for the overwhelming majority
of consumer debtors for three reasons.
First, both laws allowed consumers to seek a court-imposed settlement
agreement, possibly settling debts for less than full payment, 22 but only with
the assent of large majorities of creditors and, in most cases, a minimum
payout from the debtor. To force a settlement on recalcitrant creditors, the
Konkursordnung required the assent of a majority of the total number of
creditors, and of creditors holding at least 75% of total claims.23 The
Vergleichsordnung imposed even more stringent requirements. In addition
19See, e.g., EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS' HANDBOOK I 11 (Sir Kenneth Cork
& G.A. Weiss eds., 1984) [hereinafter INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK]; 1 J.H. DALHUISEN,
DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY §§ 2.02[7], 2.04, 3.07[2]

(1983); cf.EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS 17, 61, 96, 108 (David A. Botwinik & Kenneth
W. Weinrib eds., 2d ed. 1986) (noting that as of the mid-1980s, the bankruptcy laws of
Belgium, France, Italy, and Poland, for example, applied only to merchants).
20 Translated literally as "Forced Auction Act," the Konkursordnung was enacted in 1877
and was promulgated in 1879, and it remained in force until the implementation of the new
Insolvency Act in 1999. See, e.g., DALHUISEN, supra note 19, § 3.07[2]. The primary goal
and effect of the law was liquidation of the debtor's estate and distribution of value to
creditors-not reorganization or relief from debt. See, e.g., EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS,
supra note 19, at 76.
21 The Vergleichsordnung,which translates literally as "Agreement Act," was enacted in
1935 to offer a preventative measure to avoid the strict requirements and value-destructive

effect of the forced liquidation under the Konkursordnung.

See, e.g., EUROPEAN

BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 76; DALHUISEN, supra note 19, § 3.07[2].
22 See, e.g; EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 76-77; INSOLVENCY
HANDBOOK,

supra note 19, at 124, 127-37.

23See, e.g., INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 124; MANFRED BALZ, DER
VERBRAUCHER
IM
INSOLVENZRECHT:
RECHTPOLITISCHE
UBERLEGUNGEN,
in
VERBRAUCHERKREDIT UND VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ: PERSPEKTIVEN FOR DIE RECHTSPOLITIK

AUS EUROPA UND USA 250, 253 (1986). The pre-1999 German bankruptcy law was thus
quite similar to the several pre-1898 U.S. bankruptcy laws, which also required majority and
sometimes supermajority creditor assent. See Bankruptcy Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 36,
2 Stat. 31 (repealed 1803); Bankruptcy Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 443-44
(repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 533 (repealed
1878).
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to convincing a majority of creditors and those holding between 75% and
80% of total claims, 24 the proposed settlement had to offer payment of at
least 35% of all claims.2 5 Consumers in particular were unlikely to be able
to clear either the majority creditor assent hurdle or the minimum payment
hurdle.26 As a result, forced settlements under the Konkursordnung, and
cases initiated under the Vergleichsordnung, represented only a miniscule
percentage of all debt relief proceedings in Germany.27
Second, a case could be opened under the Konkursordnung only if the
debtor's available assets could be expected to cover the significant costs of
the proceedings (including administrator's fees and court costs). 2 8 Most
debtors-both consumers and businesses-were thus doomed to failure
immediately out of the gate. This minimum assets requirement led to the
dismissal of over 75% of all cases under the Konkursordnung.29 One
suspects that the vast majority of consumer cases fell within the doomed
"insufficient assets" category.
24 See, e.g., EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 76-77; INSOLVENCY
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 133-34; Balz, supra note 23, at 252.
25See, e.g., EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 76; INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK,

supra note 19, at 127. In addition, the minimum dividend rose to 40% if the plan proposed a
payout over longer than one year. See EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 76.

26 See, e.g., Balz, supra note 23, at 253 (explaining that consumers might
hope for a
forced settlement only if third parties were willing to put up money to support the plan).
27 See, e.g., Balz, supra note 23, at 252-53 (pointing out that forced settlements under the
Konkursordnung occurred in only 8% of all cases, and noting that the Vergleichsordnung
had "lost more and more meaning since its entry into force," and that in the mid-1980s,
fewer than 1% of insolvency cases were initiated under the Vergleichsordnung, the majority
of which led to no agreement); Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act:
Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM BANKR. L.J. 417, 419 (1996); BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 72;

KOMuISSION FOR INSOLVENZRECHT, ERSTER BERICHT DER KOMMISSION FUR INSOLVENRECHT

461, App. 11 (1985) (showing percentage of cases under Vergleichsordnungas less than 2%
of all insolvency cases after 1975, and less than 1% after 1980); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG,
STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SITZUNG 19118 (Apr. 21, 1994), available at http://
www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/showdok.pl?k=BAP 12/222 (last visited Jul. 7,
2003) (noting that fewer than 40 Vergleichsordnungproceedings were initiated per year by
1994).
28 See, e.g., INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 113; EUROPEAN
BANKRUPTCY

LAWS, supra note 19, at 78; Balz, supra note 23, at 251.
29 See, e.g., Kamlah, supra note 27, at 419; KoMMIssiON FOR INSOLVENZRECHT, supra
note 27, at 459, App. I (showing percentages of cases dismissed for lack of assets between
1900 and 1983); INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 113; EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY

LAWS, supra note 19, at 75, 78; BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 72.
30One member of the commission that was established to reform the German insolvency
laws estimated that the number of true "consumer" proceedings under the old
Konkursordnung amounted to only about 5% of all cases. See Balz, supra note 23, at 25051. See also, infra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that, before cost-deferral
reform in 2001, 90% of consumer insolvency cases under the Insolvency Act were dismissed
for lack of assets).
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Finally, the most important deficiency of pre-1999 German bankruptcy
law was that German law had never offered a forced discharge of unpaid
debt at the conclusion of bankruptcy proceedings. 31 The Konkursordnung
focused on facilitating the enforcement of creditors' claims, not on relieving
the honest debtor of a heavy debt burden.32 Following insolvency
proceedings, all creditors included on the debtor's schedule of debts could
receive a writ of execution, allowing them to seize the debtor's future
property and future income, at any time for up to thirty years.33 Thus, the
German Konkursordnung relegated most consumer debtors to life-long
indebtedness in the "modem debtor's prison. 34 Consequently, many such
31 See, e.g., INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 128; EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY

LAWS, supra note 19, at 79. In the former Ldnder of the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany), a different law offered a sort of discharge. Under section 18, paragraph 2, clause
3 of the Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung(literally, the "Collective Enforcement Act"), or
GesO, after a debtor had undergone an insolvency proceeding, creditors could enforce their
claims against the debtor only to the extent that the debtor accumulated enough savings to
acquire new property beyond a "normal lifestyle corresponding to his or her personal and
professional situation." This lifestyle had to be "neither poor nor overly costly." See FRANK
WENZEL, DIE "RESTSCHULDBEFREIUNG" IN DEN NEUEN BUNDESLANDERN §§ III(3)-(4), VII(l)

(1994); BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 104-05, 188. This approach destroyed any incentive
for productive life beyond a minimal existence following insolvency proceedings, and so can
hardly be compared to the "fresh start" discharge offered by U.S. law and the new German
Insolvency Act. See id. at §§ VII(l), (2) and (4) (explaining that, because the GesO didn't
offer a real "discharge," it failed to provide a way out of the "modem debtor's prison" or to
provide incentive to pay creditors, and therefore should not be adopted in Germany as a
whole following reunification). Moreover, the GesO suffered from the same problem as the
Konkursordnung, in that courts dismissed "the great majority" of cases under the Bankruptcy
Act because consumer debtors possessed insufficient assets to cover the costs of the
proceeding. See id.at §§ VI(5)(c), VII(1).
32See,

e.g.,

Walther

Gerhardt,

VON

DER

INSOLVENZRECHTSREFORM

ZUR

INSOLVENZORDNUNG-ENTWICKLUNG UND ENDPRODUKT AUS DER PERSONLICHEN SICHT EINES
KOMMiSSIONSMITGLIEDS, N FESTGABE ZIVILRECHTSLEHRER 1934/1935, at 121, 143 (Walther
Hadding ed., 1999); KoMMISSION FUR INSOLVENZRECHT, ZWEITER BERICHT DER KOMMISSION

FOR INSOLVENZRECHT 163 (1986).
33See, e.g., KOMMISSION FOR INSOLVENZRECHT, supra note 32, at 162; BR-DR. 1/92,
supra note 8, at 81, 187-88; INSOLVENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 123; EUROPEAN
BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 19, at 79. Indeed, enforcement proceedings undertaken at
any point within the 30-year period reset the clock. See, e.g., RATH, supra note 17, at § 3.2;
KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 133; BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 81.
34See, e.g., RATH, supra note 17, at § 1; KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at

134; Balz, supra note 23, at 251; DEUTSCHER BUNDESRAT, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT,
639. SITZUNG 81 (Feb. 14, 1992), available at http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/
hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=BBP639 (last visited Jul. 7, 2003) (lamenting the special problem
of the "modem debtor's prison," from which many debtors cannot escape despite all efforts);
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 94. SITZUNG 7770-71, 7775 (Jun. 3,
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/
at
available
1992),
show dok.pl?k=BAP12/94 (last visited Jul. 7, 2003) (explaining that simple debtors needed
a new insolvency law "to come out of the debtor's prison" and noting that 1.4 million
households were trapped in the "modem debtor's prison"); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG,

The Innovative German Approach to ConsumerDebt Relief
24:257 (2004)

debtors resigned to life in the shadow economy and work on the black
market.3 5
Consumer debtors were thus consigned to "living in poverty" 36 under
the meager protections of German law shielding certain property and
income from seizure. 37 Even today, only a narrow range of consumer
property remains outside the grasp of creditors seeking to execute
judgments. German law exempts from seizure general personal and
household items only "to the extent that they are required for the debtor's
modest lifestyle and domestic activity, appropriate to his or her
occupational activity and indebtedness," as well as items necessary for the
debtor's profession .38 Indeed, if necessary items are overly "luxurious,"
such as a color television as opposed to a black-and-white television, they39
can be seized and replaced by the creditor with less luxurious alternatives.
The German property exemptions take seriously the word "modest,"
placing virtually anything of significant value within reach of creditors. 40

STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SITZUNG, supra note 27, at 19120, 19124, 19126-27

(noting the great significance of a discharge of debt to release "approximately 1.7 million
overindebted households ... imprisoned in a modem debtor's prison" and referring to the
"lifelong debtor's prison" of pre-1999 law).
35See, e.g., BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 81; WENZEL, supra note 31, at § VII(2).
36 A study conducted in the late 1980s used this phrase to describe life under the German
wage and property exemptions. KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 299.
17 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 188; RATH,supra note 17, at §
3 (noting the paucity
of debt regulation options for consumers prior to 1999).
38 See ZIvILPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Arts. 811(1), (5) (2003).
Only "clothing, underwear, bedding, [and] household and kitchen utensils" are specifically
identified in this list, see id., but such items as refrigerators, washing machines, radios,
black-and-white television sets, and furniture likely fall within the exemption, as well. See,
e.g., Theo Rauh, Germany, METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE 111, 116
(Peter Kaye ed., 1996); BUNDESARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT SCHULDNERBERATUNG E.V., WAS
TUN, WENN DER GERICHTSVOLLZIEHER KOMMT:

RECHTE UND PLICHTEN? 4 (2003), available

at http://www.bmfsfj.de/Kategorien/Publikationen/Publikationen,did=3032.html

(last visited

Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter WAS TUN]; BUNDESMINISTERIUM FU3R FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN

16 (9th ed. 2002), availableat http://
www.bmfsfj.de/Kategorien/Publikationen/Publikationen.dud=3032.htm (last visited Jul. 3,
2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter WAS MACHE ICH].
39See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Arts. 811 a-81 I b (2003); WAS
TUN, supra note 38, at 4 (citing the example of a color television being replaced with a
black-and-white television).
40 To guard against overreaching by creditors, less valuable items are specially protected.
German law prohibits "in terrorem" seizures of items of personal value to the debtor but with
UND JUGEND, WAS MACHE ICH MIT MEINEN SCHULDEN?

low market value. "Normal household items" in use in the debtor's home may not be seized
if it is "patently obvious" that their sale would produce proceeds "completely
disproportionate to their value." See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE]

Art. 812 (2003); WAS MACHE ICH, supra note 38, at 16 (noting that such items as washing
machines and video equipment will not likely fall to execution, as transportation and
realization costs exceed their value).
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Similarly, until recently, legal restrictions on seizure protected
relatively little of German consumer debtors' wages and salary. While
most consumers in financial straits possess little if any valuable hard
property for creditors to attach, 4 1 seizure of future wages-better known as
"gamishment"-often represents a significant source of potential value for
creditors and a serious potential hardship for debtors. Indeed, unlike the
law of the United States and many European countries, German law allows
for the free contractual assignment of future wages as security for
repayment of debt, even before financial trouble arises.4 2 Such future wage
assignments have been extremely common in Germany as a means of
securing consumer credit.43
41 See, e.g., HERGENRODER, supra note 18, at § 1II(3)(c); Holzscheck, supra note 9, at
7980 (noting that execution proceedings against consumer debtors result in even partial
payment of the debt in only 10% of cases). One other fact suggests that many German
debtors have no attachable assets. If the court official in charge of attaching property (the
Gerichtsvollzieher) is unable to find attachable property, German creditors can demand
(under penalty of up to 6 months imprisonment) that the debtor execute an affidavit, called
an Eidesstattliche Versicherung, detailing his or her assets. If the debtor executes such a
document, his or her name is listed in an official debtor list, which is circulated countrywide, for three years, during which time the debtor loses his or her ability to obtain credit.
See WAS MACHE ICH, supra note 38, at 17; see also http://www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004)(on file with author) (explaining the operation of the
Eidesstattliche Versicherung, also called an Offenbarungseid). Hundreds of thousands of
German debtors had executed such affidavits by the late 1980s attesting to their lack of
attachable assets. See KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at XXIII, XL (citing
630,000 such affidavits filed by 1989); BONNEMANN & RICKAL, supra note 12, at § 1 (citing
630,000 such affidavits filed by 1989). The number of Eidesstattliche Versicherung

continues to rise. See, e.g., STATISTISCHE ZAHLEN ZU VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZVERFAHREN

2000, available at http://www.infodienst-schuldnerberatung.de/infos/insoent2000/
insoent2000.html (last visited Jul. 21, 2003) (reporting that the number of affidavits filed
annually suddenly doubled to 818,000 in the years preceding 1999).
IM JAHR

42 See, e.g., KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 129 (explaining that clauses in

credit contracts assigning future wages and salary are legal so long as the purpose and extent
of the assignment and the circumstances leading to enforcement of the assignment are
adequately and clearly described, and the assignment leads to a reasonable balance of the
interests of the parties); Balz, supra note 23, at 268-69 (noting that future wage and salary
assignments are extremely common in Germany, while they are heavily restricted in
countries like the United States, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland); cf 49 Fed. Reg.
7740, 7755-61 (1984) (outlawing most forms of future wage assignments in the United
States as unfair trade practices).
43 See, e.g., KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 129 (describing future wage and
salary assignment as "a widespread credit security measure" commonly inserted into credit
contracts); Holzscheck, supra note 9, at 80 (noting that wage assignments are the most
common out-of-court enforcement mechanism in Germany); Balz, supra note 23, at 268-69
(noting that "by far the largest portion of consumer credit" is secured by future wage and
salary assignments); BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101 (expressing concern that future
wages as a credit protection
device should not be unduly
limited);
BESCHLUSSEMPFEHLUNGEN UND BERICHT DES RECHTSAUSSCHUSSES (6. AusscHuss) ZU DEM
GESETZENTWURF
DER BUNDESREGIERUNG-DRUCKSACHE
12/2443-ENTWURF EINER
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German law exempts a certain amount of future wages from both
garnishment 44 and assignment, 4' but the restrictions in place during the
1980s and 1990s left affected debtors with rather little exempt income.
Applying a rough average historical conversion rate, 4466 the German wage
exemptions applicable between April 1, 1984, and July 1, 1992, 47 allowed
childless couples, for example, to keep an absolute maximum of about
$13,250 per year. 8 After July 1, 1992, childless couples could keep an

INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INsO), BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE [BT-DR.] 12/7302, at 170 (Apr. 19,

1994),
available
at
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/
show dok.pl?k=BAD12/7302 (last visited Jul. 18, 2003) (rejecting proposals to limit wage
assignments, as such assignments "represent important security devices for formal consumer
credit").
44 See ZMLPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Arts. 850-850k (2003).
45 One of the requirements for a valid wage assignment is that the assigned wages must
not be subject to an exemption.

See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [CIVIL CODE] Art. 400.

Thus, wages that are exempt from attachment pursuant to Articles 850-850k of the Code of
Civil Procedure are also not subject to assignment. This and other requirements for
assignments of wages and other third-party claims are discussed in several very enlightening
web pages by Professor Helmut Riissmann, see http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.de/bvr99/
Vorlesung/abtretung.htm (last visited Jul. 2, 2003); see also FAQ file on wage assignments,
at http://www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with author).
46 These converted amounts use a very rough average exchange rate of two
Deutschmarks per dollar in the 1980s and 1990s. I arrived at this rough average using the
historical exchange rate tables for Deutschmarks to U.S. Dollars between 1980 and 2000 at
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Jul. 3, 2003).
47 These are the effective dates of the fifth and sixth laws increasing the wage
exemptions. See GESETZESBESCHLUSS DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES: FuNFTES GESETZ ZUR
AkNDERUNG DER PFANDUNGSFREIGRENZEN, BR-DR. 32/84, at 2 (Feb. 3, 1984), available at

http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=BBD32/84 (last visited
Jul. 18, 2003); GESETZESBESCHLUSS DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES: SECHSTES GESETZ ZUR
,ANDERUNG DER PFMNDUNGSFREIGRENZEN, BR-DR. 127/92, at 1 (Feb. 21, 1992), availableat
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=BBD127/92 (last visited
Jul. 18, 2003).
48The maximum exemption is calculated by taking a 100% exemption in the first $6500
per year, then adding 50% of wages between $6500 and $20,000. See BR-DR. 32/84, supra
note 47, at 1, Art. 1(4) (exempting 1092 DM base per month plus 50% up to 3302 DM per
month maximum).
I have multiplied the monthly exemptions by 12 for easier
comprehension by U.S. readers more familiar with annual income comparisons. The
somewhat complicated German wage exemption scheme proceeds in three steps: First, it
allots a base exemption in 100% of a certain amount of monthly wages, depending upon the
number of people in the debtor's household (or a former household to whom the debtor
owed a support obligation). Second, the debtor is then granted an exemption in a sliding
percentage of monthly wages beyond the base exemption amount, again depending upon the
number of his or her dependent obligations (30% for single people, 50% for those with one
support obligation, and 10% more for each additional obligation up to a maximum of 5).
Finally, all debtors are subject to the same maximum monthly wage beyond which all wages
are fully seizable. Thus, single debtors with no dependent obligations receive 100% of a
minimum amount plus 30% of excess wages up to the maximum, those with one dependent
obligation (married debtors, for example) receive a slightly higher minimum 100% exempt
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absolute maximum of about $16,500 ler year.49 All income above the
maximum was available to creditors.
A comparative analysis of the
buying power of these sums in the United States and Germany in the 1980s
and 1990s is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to observe that a
young couple would be hard-pressed to lead even a "modest" lifestyle on
$16,500 per year in northern Europe. 5 1
III. DEVELOPMENT OF A NONCONSENSUAL DISCHARGE FOR CONSUMER

DEBT
Consumers occupied a sort of no-man's land in German debt relief law
before 1999. Lawmakers were loath to interfere with the consequences of
bargains struck between debtors and creditors. They resisted the notion of
allowing consumers to escape their debts other than by re-negotiating their
agreements with creditors. Powerful economic change ultimately produced
enough political pressure to bring consumer protection to the fore, and
reformers introduced a revoluti6n in debtor-creditor relations-the
discharge of unpaid debt. Such a potent legal remedy, though, had to be
balanced by careful measures to avoid misuse. This Part describes the path
from no discharge to a discharge in stages, subject to ostensibly heavy
requirements. Part III.A describes the early stages of debt relief law reform
in Germany, from resistance to acceptance of the notion of freeing debtors
from unpaid debt. Part III.B describes in detail the series of stages through
which a consumer debt relief case passes under the new Insolvency Act.
This part examines the past, present, and likely future provisions of the new
law. Finally, Part III.C looks to the future of German consumer debt relief
amount plus 50% of excess wages up to the maximum, and those with two through five
exemptions (married debtors with one through four children, for example) receive a steadily
increasing minimum exemption plus 60% through 90% of excess wages (10% for each
dependent obligation up to the fifth) up to the maximum. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE
OF CrIL PROCEDURE] Art. 850c (2003); WAS MACHE ICH, supra note 38, at 20-22, 69-74

(setting forth exemption tables and an illustrative example of how to calculate the exemption
amount). Actually, income exemptions are even more complicated than this, as varying
percentages of vacation pay and benefits payments, for example, are exempt. For a more
detailed discussion, see VORSCHRIFTEN OBER DIE BERECHNUNG DES PFANDBAREN
EINKOMMENS, available at http://www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de/

(last visited Jul. 14,

2003) (on file with author).
49 This constitutes an increased base exemption of about $10,000 per year plus 50% of
wages between $10,000

and $23,000.

See GESETZENTWURF DER BUNDESREGIERUNG:

ENTWURF EINES SECHSTEN GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DER PFANDUNGSFREIGRENZEN, BT-DR.

12/1754, at 4, Art. 1(3) (Dec. 5, 1991) (exempting DM 1677 base per month plus 50% up to
DM 3796 per month maximum).
50See supra,note 48 (explaining the three-step wage exemption scheme).
51The threshold for poverty assistance for a single person with no dependents in
Germany in December 1990, for example, was about $7000 per year (DM 1153 per month).
See BT-DR. 12/1754, supra note 49, at 16 (noting the change in the poverty level during the
1980s).
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law with observations about growth and stability in the foreseeable future.
A. Early History and Resistance to the Concept of Discharge
The plight of overburdened consumers drew no attention in the earliest
bankruptcy reform efforts in Germany.5 2 The oil crisis of 1973 and its
widespread negative consequences for business originally sparked the
movement for reform, when in 1978 the German Minister of Justice
appointed a commission to study the bankruptcy laws and recommend
much needed change. 3 The Commission on Insolvency Law issued two
reports, one in 1985 and the other in 1986.54 The first report contained no
mention of any issue relating to corisumnr indebtedness, focusing instead on
the desperate need for reform in big business insolvency proceedings and
secured transactions law. 55
The second report dealt with an issue of central concern to
consumers-the post-bankruptcy discharge of debt-but it concluded that
"a discharge after the Anglo-American model is out of the question. '56 The
Commission adhered firmly and unanimously to the notion that debtors
could escape their unpaid debts only by agreement with creditors.5 7
Bankruptcy law served in the first instance to facilitate creditor'enforcement
of the debtor's obligations, the Commission insisted, "it is in no way to
function as a 'debt-divestiture proceeding' to help the debtor to rid himself
of his obligations., 58 The Commission recognized that some form of
expanded protection against judgment enforcement might be appropriate for
consumers, but it demurred as to such questions, as they fell within "a
problem of consumer protection, especially in connection with consumer
credit, which has no immediate relationship to insolvency law reform." 59
See RATH, supra note 17, at § 5.1.
" See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 103; RATH,supra note 17, at § 5.1.
52

54Id.
55See KOMMISSION FOR INSOLVENZRECHT, ERSTER BERICHT DER KoMMISSION FOR

INSOLVENZRECHT (1985); Balz, supra note 23, at 261.
56 KoMMiSSION

FOR

INSOLVENZRECHT,

ZWEITER

BERICHT

DER

KOMMISSION

FOR

INSOLVENZRECHT § 6.3 (1986) [hereinafter, ZWEITER BERICHT]; see also Gerhardt, supra note

32, at 142.
57See ZWEITER BERICHT, supra note 56, at § 6.3; Gerhardt, supra note 32, at 142.
58ZWEITER BERICHT, supra note 56, at § 6.3.
59Id.; Gerhardt, supra note 32, at 143 (explaining that a provision dealing with the social
and socio-political problems of post-bankruptcy indebtedness seemed inappropriate to
connect with bankruptcy law). The Kohl Administration disagreed, explaining in its
proposed bill that "insolvency law must also make a contribution" to overcoming the
increasing problem of consumer overindebtedness. See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 104.
The push to move provisions for discharge out of the insolvency law and into an independent
procedure found new life in the Bundesrat. See EMPFERLUNGEN DER AUSSCHOSSE ZUM
ENTWURF ErNE R INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INsO), BR-DR. 1/1/92, supra note 18, at 50-51 (Feb.
4, 1992); STELLUNGNAHME DES BUNDESRATES ZUM ENTWURF EINE R INSOLVENZORDNUNG
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Political change undermined the Commission's views, and the
discharge of debt following insolvency proceedings-especially for
consumers-became an essential plank in the platform of insolvency law
reform. In 1986, a national election brought to power a new Minister of
Justice who prioritized the implementation of a discharge of personal
liability following bankruptcy.6 ° In December 1988, the Ministry of Justice
and the Ministry for Youth, Family, Women and Health commissioned a
research group to investigate the growing problem of consumer
overindebtedness in Germany. 6' The commission's 1989 report on the
explosion of consumer debt and its dire consequences 62 supported the
introduction
of new discharge provisions into the bill for a new insolvency 4
63
law, which was finally introduced into the Bundesrat on January 3, 1992.
The first section of the proposed new law announced that the goals of
insolvency proceedings would henceforth encompass not only equitable
distribution of the debtor's assets among creditors, but also the opportunity
for "[t]he honest debtor.., to free himself of his remaining debts. 6 5 The
report accompanying the new bill explained that the meager economic gains
(INsO), BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 26-27 (Feb. 14, 1992); EMPFEHLUNGEN DER
AUSSCHOSSE ZU PUNKT DER 669. SITZUNG DES BUNDESRATES AM 20. MAI 1994:

INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INsO), BR-DR. 336/1/94, at 1-3 (May 10, 1994), available at http://
www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=-BBD336/1/94. The Bundestag
has consistently rejected this approach, however, and the discharge is now firmly lodged in
German insolvency law. Id.
60See RATH,supra note 17, at § 5.1.
61KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at XXXVI.

Id.
63 Reunification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990, also spurred the
62

movement toward consumer debt relief, as "East German society [confronted] the consumer
habits of the West." See Christoph G. Paulus, The New German Insolvency Code, 33 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 141, 143 (1998).

64See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 3, 46-49 (§§ 235-252), 81-82, 84, 100-02, 187-94.
The legislative process in Germany begins for most bills, like it did for the Insolvency Act,
with introduction of the bill by the Administration into the Bundesrat, or upper house of
Parliament. See, e.g., NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS § 2.1.1 (1993). The

bill continues in the lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag, through three "readings," or
analyses and debates, beginning with referral to committee, which constitutes the most
extensive and exacting stage of the legislative process. See id The bill as passed by the
Bundestag must be approved by the Bundesrat, sometimes after a conference committee
hammers out remaining differences between the two chambers of Parliament. See id. This
occurred for the Insolvency Act as well, but the conference committee essentially ignored
the Bundesrat's objections and re-proposed the bill to both houses in summer 1994 with only
a minor modification; i.e., that the bill's entry into force be delayed almost five years to
January 1, 1999. See CHARLES E. STEWART, INSOLVENZORDNUNG, EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ ZUR

(1997);

INSOLVENZORDNUNG

10

INSOLVENZORDNUNG

(INSO),

EINIGUNGSVORSCHLAG DES VERMITLUNGSAUSSCHUSSES:

BR-DR.

643-94

(June

24,

1994),

available at http://

www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=BBD643/94.
65BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 10.
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to be expected from creditor enforcement action were far offset by the
economic costs to debtors forced into life-long indebtedness and eking out a
lean existence with exempt wages.66 The discharge was viewed as a social

necessity. Because the former bankruptcy law lacked a discharge,67 and
agreements with creditors were the rare exception,6 8 society in general
suffered a detriment. Many debtors were forced into the shadow economy
of the black market, if they were not pushed out of productive economic life
entirely. 69 The concept of a discharge of debt found support in a growing
trend among other European nations. 0 The German version would chart a
middle path between the "debtor-friendly" Anglo-American law and the

life-long liability of former German law. 7' Reformers hoped that the
possibility of a discharge would raise debtor morale and offer new hope for

an economic new beginning,7 2 which would redound to the benefit of
society by returning debtors to productive activity and tax-paying status.7 3

B. Acceptance of Discharge Subject to "Strict Prerequisites"
Exuberance for the revolutionary new fresh start was accompanied by
deep concern for avoiding abuse of the liberal new provision. Even the
staunchest supporters of the discharge emphasized the need for "strict

prerequisites" for debtors to demonstrate worthiness for such relief and to
avoid abuse.7 4 Proponents were quick to point out that the new law would
Id., at 81, 188.
67 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
69 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 81.
66

70

The German law drew from experience under the laws of Austria, France, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, for example. See BR-DR.
1/92, supra note 8, at 105-06. Reformers paid particular attention to the United States,
which they viewed as having similar economic conditions. Id. at 104-05; BT-DR. 12/7302,
supra note 43, at 150 (noting that the Law Committee of the Bundestag had met specially
with a delegation of U.S. lawyers in November and December 1992 to discuss U.S.
bankruptcy law).
71 BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 100.
72 See, e.g., DEUTSCHER BUNDESRAT, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICI-T, 639. SITzuNG, supra
note 34, at 50, 81-82 (remarks of Secretary of State Rainer Funke, the principal drafter of the
new insolvency law); BT-DR. 12/7302, supra note 43, at 151; DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG,
STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SrrzUNG, supra note 27, at 19116, 19120-21, 19124.
7' DEUTSCHER BUNDESRAT, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 639. SITZUNG, supra note 34, at
84 (remarks of Secretary of State Rainer Funke, the principal drafter of the new insolvency
law); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SITZUNG, supra note
27, at 19120 (same, also mentioning the benefits of the debtor's not needing social
assistance); GESETZENTWURF DER BUNDESREGIERUNG:
ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR
ANDERUNG DER INSOLVENZORDNUNG UND ANDERER GESETZE, BR-DR. 14/01, at 37-38 (Jan. 5,
2001), available at http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=
BBD14/01.
74 See, e.g.,
BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 3; DEUTSCHER BUNDESRAT,
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"demand much more" than the "very debtor-friendly" U.S. model.75
Following significant reworking in committee,76 the new Insolvency Act
places a complicated four-step obstacle course between overburdened
consumer debtors and a new life after discharge. First, the debtor must
attempt to conclude an out-of-court payment agreement with all creditors. 7
Failing that, the debtor can file a petition to open an insolvency case, but
then must make another attempt at a payment plan with creditors.78 This
time, the court can impose the plan on a non-consenting minority of
creditors if a majority in both number and total amount of claims is deemed
to agree to the plan. 79 Third, if a majority of creditors cannot be enticed or
forced into a plan, simplified liquidation proceedings ensue, seeking to
realize value from the debtor's nonexempt assets.80 Finally, the debtor
confronts the most significant hurdle, a six-year payment period, during
which the debtor must exert her best efforts to obtain gainful employment
and turn over all nonexempt income to a trustee for distribution to
creditors. 8 1
This Part explores the development and application of these steps in
greater detail. Part B. 1 describes the long and seldom fruitful process of
haggling over a debt arrangement plan, both in and out of court. Part B.2
very briefly describes the "simplified liquidation proceeding" used to
extract value from the debtor's current assets. Finally, Part B.3 examines
the volatile history and implementation of the six-year payment period
preceding the final discharge of remaining unpaid debt.
1. Out-of-Court and Court-DirectedDebt Arrangement PlanNegotiations
The main goal in German consumer insolvency law is to encourage
and facilitate the execution of fair out-of-court debt arrangement

STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 639. SITZUNG, supra note 34, at 83 (remarks of Secretary of

State Rainer Funke, the principal drafter of the new insolvency law); DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 94. SITZUNG, supra note 34, at 7770 (remarks of

Secretary of State Rainer Funke,); BT-DR. 12/7302, supra note 43, at 153.
75 BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 188.
76 The special "consumer" insolvency provisions appeared for the first time after two
years of review of the bill by Bundestag committees. See BT-DR. 12/7302, supra note 43, at
2,
132-37,
153-54,
189;
Gerhard
Wagner,
DIE
ANFECHTUNG
IM
VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZVERFAHREN,

20 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 689, 690

(1999), available at http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/ruffprint/DAB 12_7329_ONo.pdf.
77 See InsO § 305(1)(1).
78 See id. at §§ 305-09.
79 See id. at § 309.
0 See id. at §§ 311-14.
81 See id.at §§ 286-303. The debtor must also turn over 50% of the value of any property
acquired by inheritance. See id. at § 295.
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agreements among debtors and creditors. 82 To this end, the Insolvency Act
requires debtors to make two attempts to forge a reasonable payment
arrangement with creditors. A consumer insolvency case begins in
Germany with the debtor's attempt to reach a consensus with all creditors
on an out-of-court renegotiation of claims.83 In negotiating
this plan, the
84
debtor must be supported by a "suitable person or office.
The "suitable person or office" thus plays a crucial role in this first
step, and the extraordinary demands on and insufficient numbers of such
people have created serious bottlenecks in the system from the beginning.
The Ldnder (individual German States) determine which "persons or
agencies" are suitable,8 5 and the two most common such persons are
lawyers and state-sponsored debt counselors.86 Because lawyers have
resisted taking on high-work, low-pay consumer insolvency cases, 87 the
bulk of the burden in this first stage has fallen on the network of statesponsored debt counseling centers (Schuldnerberatungsstelle) spread
throughout Germany.8 8
82 See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SITZUNG, supra note
27, at 19116 (comments of Joachim Gres, one of the drafters of the Committee Report on the
insolvency law as finally enacted). A pamphlet distributed by the Ministry of Family,
Seniors, Women and Youth describes out-of-court debt arrangement as the "kings way" in
debt regulation. See WAS MACHE ICH, supra note 38, at 37.
83 The law imposes this requirement in a pessimistic way, in that it requires a certificate

attesting to failure of an out-of-court settlement attempt within the last six months to be filed
along with the petition opening insolvency proceedings. See InsO § 305(l)(1).
84 See id. at § 305(1)(1).
85 id.
86 See, e.g., BT-DR. 12/7302, supra note 43, at 190.
87 See Gerhard Pape, ErN JAHR VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ-EINE ZWISCHENBILANZ, 20
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 2037, 2040 (1999); BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE
"INSOLVENZRECHT," PROBLEME DER PRAKTISCHEN ANWENDUNGEN UND SCHWACHSTELLEN

DES VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZVERFAHRENS § (B)(I)(2)(b) (2000), available at http://
www.jm.nrw.de/JM/justizpolitk/schwerpunkte/insolvenzrecht/pdf/zwischenbericht.pd;
HERGENRODER, supra note 18, at § IV(2)(d) (reporting one lawyer's description of
representing insolvency clients as "dark bread with hard crust"). But see also DANIELA
LrrScHKE, DIE NUTZUNG DES VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZVERFAHRENS:
ANALYSE ANHAND
EINER DATENERHEBUNG IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 28 (2000), available at http://www.sfzmainz.de/dateien/abhandlungenldiplom litschke.pdf (reporting that only 30% of the out-ofcourt payment plan negotiations were directed by debt counseling centers in SchleswigHolstein from January 1999 to June 2000, suggesting that lawyers and tax counselors played
a much greater role here than originally expected).
88 Today, over 1100 of these public debt counseling centers are located throughout
Germany. See, e.g., WAS MACHE ICH, supra note 38, at 27. The public debt counseling
centers grew slowly between 1958 and 1984, and their numbers increased dramatically
beginning in 1984, when public authorities reacted to the skyrocketing incidence and
severity of over-indebtedness. See KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 187-88. For
a description of the operation of modem German debt counseling centers, see WAS MACHE
ICH, supra note 38, at 27-36; KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 171-263; see also
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Due to poor financial support from the Ldnder,8 9 the debt counseling
centers are unable to provide sufficient personnel to support the masses of
debtors seeking entry into the insolvency relief process. 0 In the early years
after passage of the Insolvency Act, debtors at about half of these centers
had to wait two to eight weeks for a first appointment, while waiting
periods at the other centers stretched from three months to a year. 9' Indeed,
some debt counseling centers had to turn away those seeking help by mid2000, as their waiting lists had simply grown too long. 92 Far fewer cases
were opened in the first two years under the Insolvency Act than had been
expected, 93 and these long waiting periods for support in the out-of-court
94
first stage of the process represented a major cause of the dearth of cases.
Long waiting periods notwithstanding, statistics suggest that debt
Nick Huls, Towards a European Approach to Overindebtedness of Consumers, 16 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 215, 216 (1993) [hereinafter, Huls, Towards a EuropeanApproach].
'9 See BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 17; Heinz Vallender, Erste gerichtliche
Erfahrungen mit dem
Verbraucherinsolvenzverfahren, 20
ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT

125,

125-26

(1999);

THOMAS

FORDERUNGEN DER VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZBERATUNG

SEETHALER,

OBERSICHT

DER

IN DEN BUNDESLANDERN (2003),

available at http://www.infodienst-schuldnerberatung.de/themen/foerderungsblaender/
foerderungsblaender.html.
90 By some estimates, the debt counseling centers could manage only 5-10% of the need
for advice even before the Insolvency Act increased the demand for their services. See
KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 268.
91 See, e.g.,

WOLFGANG SCHRANKENMULLER,

SCHULDNER WARTE, WARTE NOCH EIN

WEILCHEN...
ZUM UMGANG
DER
SCHULDNERBERATUNG
MIT DEM ANSTURM
OBERSCHULDETER MENSCHEN AUF DIE BERATUNGSSTELLEN §§ 1-2 (2000), availableat http://

www.infodienst-schuldnerberatung.de/praxisthema/andrang/andrang.html
(reporting that
waiting periods up to a year were reported to be "the norm rather than the exception" after
the entry into force of the Insolvency Act); RATH, supra note 17, at § 4.3; see also
SENATSVERWALTUNG FOR ARBEIT, SOZIALES UND FRAUEN, ENTWICKLUNG DER SCHULDNERUND

INSOLVENBERATUNG

IN

LAND

BERLIN

NACH

INKRAFTTRETEN

DER

VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZORDNUNG 20, 24 (2000), available at http://www.berlin.de/
sengessozv/lageso/pdf/pkg9e.pdf (reporting that waiting times in Berlin had been reduced to
3-6 months for first appointments by December 2000).
92 See SCHRANKENMOLLER,
93 See,

e.g.,

supra note 91, at § 2.

PRESSEERKLARUNG

ZUR

SONDERVERANSTALTUNG:

100

TAGE

INSOLVENZRECT-EXPERTEN ZIEHEN BILANZ (April 24, 1999), available at http://
www.insolvenzverein.de/archiv/presseschau/PeHundert.htm (reporting that only 39 petitions
were filed in the first 100 days of the new Insolvency Act); Vallender, supra note 89, at 125.
Lack of funds to cover the substantial costs of proceedings accounted for perhaps the largest
reason for the low numbers of cases. See infra note 128.
94 See BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE "INSOLVENZRECHT," supra note 87, §§ (A)(4),
(B)(I)(2)(b); Vallender, supra note 89, at 125-26; Pape, supra note 87, at 2040; W.
UHLENBRUCK, EIN JAHR INSO-ZIEL ERREICHT ODER REFORMBEDARF? § 11(1) (1999),

availableat http://www.insolvenzverein.de/archiv/vortragstexte/Uhlenbruckv.htm; MICHAEL
ScHUTz, EROFFNETE VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZVERFAHREN IN BAYERN 1999 (2000), available
at http://www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de (suggesting that lack of support for debt
counseling centers contributed to the low numbers of cases opened in Bavaria in 1999).
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counseling centers in many Lander have been quite successful in brokering
out-of-court debt arrangements. Between the entry into force of the
Insolvency Act in 1999 and October 2001, for example, out-of-court plans
had been established with creditors in between 11% and 54% of cases in the
various Ldnder.95 The average rate of creditor agreements to out-of-court
plans negotiated by debt counseling centers reached just over 30%
federation-wide in 2001.96 In densely populated Berlin, 7 the quota of
agreed out-of-court arrangements hovered around 15% in 2000 and 2001.98
99
In the most populous and industrialized Land of North Rhine-Westphalia,
where the capital Bonn is located, of 4,682 total attempted arrangements in
which negotiations continued to completion,'0 0 2,084 agreements resulteda success yield of over 44%. 101 Such impressive success rates are due in
some cases, however, to the support of regional organizations that offer
loans and subsidies to help debtors to make one-time payments to creditors
to entice them into accepting a plan. 0 2 Moreover, successful development
of payment plans does not necessarily lead to successful completion of such
plans by debtors. I could find no statistics reporting on final completion of
out-of-court plans, but experience in the United States suggests
that the rate
03
of successful completion is likely no more than one in three.1
One dissenting creditor can destroy an out-of-court plan, 10 4 so the
95 See SEETHALER, supra note 89.
96 Id.
97 Berlin is considered its own Land, and it is the most densely populated Land, with
3800 inhabitants per square kilometer. See STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT, BEVOLKERUNG:
FLACHE UND BEVOLKERUNG (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.destatis.de/jahrbuch/

jahrtab 1.htm.
" See SENATSVERWALTUNG FOR ARBEIT, SOZIALES UND FRAUEN, supra note 91, at 16.
99 With over 18 million people, North Rhine-Westphalia has nearly twice as many
inhabitants as the next most highly populous Land, Baden-WOrttemberg. See STATISTISCRE
BUNDESAMT, supra note 97.
100A substantial portion of negotiations are broken off before any conclusion is reached.
In North Rhine-Westphalia in 2001, for example, 1,891 negotiations broke off early with no
result, while 4,682 continued to final success or failure. See FORDERUNG VON SCHULDNER/INSOLVENZBERATUNG
IN DEN BUNDESLANDERN 7 (2003), available at http://
www.infodienst-schuldnerberatung.de/themen/foerderungsblaender/
foerderungsblaender.pdf.
101See id.
102 See SEETHALER, supra note 89 (reporting that such subsidies are offered in BadenWiirttemberg); LITSCHKE, supra note 87, at 53 (referring to such subsidy programs in the
northernmost Land of Schleswig-Holstein).
103 See infra note 236, reporting on completion rates for Chapter 13 payment plans in the
United States.
104 See Pape, supra note 87, at 2040; HERGENRODER, supra note 18, at § (IV)(2)(b). The
debt counseling center in the Land of Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania reported in 2001, for
example, that many creditors caused the failure of debt arrangements despite their own
interests. The debtors had offered, with the financial assistance of third parties, payments of
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court-driven part of the insolvency process begins with another, in-court
attempt to negotiate an agreed payment plan. This time, the court can force
a dissenting minority of creditors into a plan if a majority of both total
number of creditors and amount of claims either votes in favor of the plan
or fails to vote within one month after service of the plan documents.' 0 In
addition, two other conditions must be met. In order for the court to "cram
down" 106 a plan on dissenting minority creditors, the proposed plan must
offer each creditor an appropriate share in relation to other creditors, and
dissenting creditors may not be placed in a worse economic position than
they would occupy were the case to continue through the liquidation and
six-year payment period. 0 7 The early yield of court-imposed payment
plans was much lower-only about 1.5% of all consumer cases filed in
1999, for example, ended with a court-brokered plan.'0 8 Once again, I was
unable to locate any statistics reporting on successful completion of
payments under such plans.
This second stage of in-court plan negotiation is destined for
elimination and integration into the out-of-court process in the near future.
Dedication to the court-driven plan process has been rapidly eroding from
the outset. The federal-state (Bund-Ldnder) working group commissioned
by the Ministry of Justice to study consumer insolvency in its early stages
concluded that the in-court plan process often represented a "pure
formality," and it pointed out a long string of commentaries criticizing the
process.'09 "In many proceedings," the group's report revealed, "it is clear
from the beginning that the necessary majority of creditors supporting the
plan cannot be achieved," particularly when, as is often the case, the debtor
has no nonexempt income to offer creditors in the plan, or one large creditor

over 20% of creditor claims, while the creditors stood to collect nothing in insolvency
proceedings from the debtors with no non-exempt income. See PETER SCHNEIDER, ZUR
SITUATION UBERSCHULDETER PRIVATER HAUSHALTE IN MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 78
(2002), available at http://www.bagschuldnerberatung.de/download/Schneider/ 20%
20Zur/o20Situation%20%FCberschuldeter/o20privater%20Haushalte%20in%20Mecklenbur
gVorpommern%20Jahresbericht%202001 .doc.
105 See InsO §§ 307(1), 308, 309.
106 This buzzword from U.S. bankruptcy law corresponds quite closely to what happens
in the German system. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY §
17.15[D] (1995).
107 See InsO § 309(1). These two requirements appear to be equivalent to two of the
central requirements for cram-down of a plan under U.S. consumer bankruptcy law, the
"equal treatment" and "best interests" tests in It U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(3) and 1325(a)(4). See
HERBERT, supra note 106, §§ 18.07[B], 18.08[A][1].
108See BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE,
supra note 87, at § (A)(4) (reporting
approximately 20,000 consumer cases filed, but only 339 court-imposed agreements).
109See BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, at

§§

(B)(I)(3)(a), (C)(3).

For a

brief description of the history of this working group, see id. § A(1)-(2); see also http://
www.jm.nrw.de/indexseite/presse/reden/200206 11 .html (last visited Jul. 10, 2003).
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refuses to support the plan."01 The representative from Saxony considered
the in-court process senseless and would have eliminated it immediately,"'I
but the working group," 2 the Administration," 3 and ultimately the German
Parliament" 4 agreed to make the process optional-with the option to be
exercised by the court." 5 As it turned out, most courts opted out of the incourt plan process and hardly undertook any further in-court plan
proceedings.
The latest reform proposal from the Administration, therefore,
essentially throws in the towel on the "largely meaningless""' 7 in-court plan
process. 8 It reinforces the earlier out-of-court process, which now fails if
even one creditor dissents, by integrating the court-imposed "cram-down"
provisions into the out-of-court stage. The reform would allow" 9 the
debtor to petition the court-before an insolvency case has been initiatedto deem an out-of-court plan accepted if the requisite majority of creditors
approves the plan or fails to respond in a timely manner to the plan
proposal. 20 If a majority of creditors rejects the out-of-court plan, or if the
debtor chooses not to seek "cram-down," the debtor will be able to initiate
an insolvency case and proceed immediately to simplified insolvency
proceedings-the current second round of (in-court) plan review and voting
will be disposed of.'2' Given the Administration's record of success in
moving its consumer insolvency reform proposals through Parliament, one
suspects that the in-court plan process will remain in place no more than
110 BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, at §§ (B)(I)(3)(a)(aa), (C)(3); Pape,
supra note 87, at 2040-42.

I"See id.at § (B)(I)(3)(a)(bb).
112 Id.

113 See BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 9, 27-28, 65-68 (calling the in-court plan process

a "naked formality" in many cases).
1"4See BESCHLUSSEMPFEHULUNG UND BERICHT DES RECHTSAUSSCHUSSES (6. AUsSCHUSS),

BT-DR. 14/6468, at 10 (June 27, 2001), available at http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/064/
1406468.pdf;

GESETZESBESCHLUSS

DES

DEUTSCHEN

BUNDESTAGES,

BR-DR.

689/01

(BESCHLUSS) (Sept. 27, 2001), available at http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/
hyperdoc/show-dok.pl?k=BBD689/01.
115 See InsO § 306(1).
116 See DISKUSSIONSENTWURF

DES BUNDESMNISTERIUMS DER JUSTIZ:

ENTWURF EINES

GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DER INSOLVENZORDNUNG, DES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS UND

ANDERER GESETZE 15 (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/
11591.pdf.
117 See id at 16.
llSSee id at 1,5-6, 15-17, 31-36.
119 Significantly, the proposal gives the debtor-not the court-the option of whether or
not to attempt to force the plan on non-consenting creditors or to proceed immediately to
insolvency proceedings. See id. at 31, 35. Court discretion is all but completely eliminated
from the "plan" phase of the process.
120 See id at 5-6
121 See id. at 16, 32.
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one more year.1 22 Unfortunately, this will exacerbate the strain on already
overburdened debt counseling centers,123 and waiting periods for access to
counseling-and consequently for formal insolvency relief-will grow
even longer.
2. Simplified liquidationproceedings

If creditors refuse a payment plan, the formal insolvency case begins
with a "simplified liquidation proceeding," in which a court-appointed
trustee sells the debtor's nonexempt assets to produce funds for distribution
to creditors. 124 Just as in the United States,121this stage of the process has

virtually no meaning in Germany. The great majority of consumer debtors
have no hard assets that are subject to liquidation for distribution to
creditors. 26 Like the old Konkursordnung,'27 the new Insolvency Act
provides for dismissal of an insolvency petition if liquidation of the debtor's

In fact, interest groups have already responded positively to this aspect of the
Administration's reform proposal. See, e.g., CARSTEN D. OHLE, STELLUNGNAHME DES
122

BUNDESVERBANDES DEUTSCHER INKASSO-UNTERNEHMEN E.V. ZUM DIsKUSSIONSENTWURF
EINES GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DER INSOLVENZORDNUNG, DES BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS
UND ANDERER GESETZE, STAND 17.04.2003 (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.inso-

rechtspfleger.de/inhalt/04_materialien2002inso ref 050.htm;
STELLUNGNAHME
DES
ARBEITSKREISES INSOLVENZORDNUNG (AK-INsO) DER AG SBV voM 3.06.2003 (Jun. 3,
2003),
available
at
http://www.inso-rechtspfleger.de/inhalt/04_materialien/
2002 inso ref 052.htm (warning of the increased burden on debt counseling centers, but
praising the general idea of the reform).
123 See

DISKUSSIONSENTWURF

ZUR ANDERUNG

DER

INSO:

AUSSERGERICHTLICHER

EINIGUNGSVERSUCH SOLL GESTARKT WERDEN (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.forum-schuldnerberatung.de
(on file with author); STELLUNGNAHME DES
ARBEITSKREISES INSOLVENZORDNUNG (AK-INsO) DER AG SBV voM 3.06.2003 (Jun. 3,
2003), supranote 122.
124See InsO §§ 311-14.
125 In the United States, for as long as anyone can remember, the overwhelming
majority
of consumer bankruptcy cases have involved either little or no seizable property. See, e.g.,
Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 456 n.14 (citing unpublished
1997 official statistics showing that "no-asset" cases constituted 95% of all Chapter 7 cases);
Michelle J. White, PersonalBankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic
Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 38 (1988) (showing a return to unsecured creditors in only 3% of
liquidation cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s); Mitchell S. Dvoret, FederalLegislation,
27 GEO. L.J. 194, 197 (1938-39) (noting that average distributions to general unsecured
creditors during the decade preceding 1932 averaged between 5.1% and 7.7%).
126 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; see also InsO § 36 (excluding exempt
assets from the insolvency estate). In a consumer information pamphlet published by the
Ministry of Justice, the hypothetical example of a consumer insolvency proceeding includes
a debtor with no available assets, acknowledging that the no-asset case is the norm. See
BUNDEsMINISTERIUM FOR JUSTIZ, RESTSCHULDBEFREIUNG-EINE NEUE CHANCE FOR REDLICHE

SCHULDNER 37 (2001), availableat http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/10074.pdf.
127 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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assets obviously will not produce sufficient proceeds to cover court costs.

28

Before the introduction in December 2001 of reforms reducing costs and
allowing the debtor to defer payment of court costs,

129

approximately 90%

of all consumer cases were dismissed under this provision "for lack of
assets." 130 A dismissed case meant then, and still means now, that there is
no discharge and no relief for the debtor.
3. Development of and debate over the "Good BehaviorPeriod"

A German consumer insolvency case concludes with the final, most
hotly debated, and most burdensome "strict prerequisite" for relief-the socalled "good behavior period" (Wohlverhaltensperiode). In addition to
giving up all nonexempt assets in the preceding stage, for six years
beginning with the opening of the simplified insolvency proceedings, the

debtor must assign to a trustee all nonexempt work-related income13 and
turn over to the trustee half of the value of any property acquired by
inheritance. 132 Once each year, the trustee distributes ratably to creditors
any income assigned during that year. 33 If the debtor makes it through four
128

See InsO § 26.

129 See id. §§ 4a-4d, 26(1), 298. The history of the problem of "no-asset" cases, high

court and trustee costs, and the implementation of the cost-deferral solution are covered at
length in the literature. See generally BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, §§
(B)(I)(4), (C)(1); BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 19-22, 28-29, 33-51, 55, 68 (among other
things, reporting per-case costs of approximately $1500); Pape, supra note 87, at 2045-46
(collecting cases); Vallender, supra note 89, at 126-27; HERGENRODER, supra note 18, §
IV(2)(a)(aa); RATH, supra note 17, §§ 6.3, 6.4.5; LITSCHKE, supra note 87, at 51, 59
(reporting that debtors in Schleswig-Holstein in 1999-2000 most often cited cost as the
reason for failing to pursue insolvency relief); THEMEN uND AKTUELLES http://
www.insolvenzrechtonline.de/0l.htm (last visited Jul. 14, 2003) (listing cases in which
courts allowed or refused to allow "PKH," or Prozesskostenhilfe, litigation cost assistance, to
consumer debtors in insolvency cases); UHLENBRUCK, supra note 94, § 11(1)(b) (noting that
in 1999 photocopying and service costs for plan documents in cases with many creditors
often exceeded $5000).
130 See BUND-LANDER-ARBETSGRUPPE, supra note 87,

§

(A)(4) (reporting approximately

20,000 consumer cases filed, but only about 2000 consumer cases opened); BR-DR. 14/01,
supra note 73, at 19, 34.
131
See InsO § 287(2).
132 See id. § 295(1)(2); cf 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2003) (requiring property inherited
within six months of the filing of a bankruptcy petition to be turned over to the trustee for
distribution to creditors).
133 See InsO § 292(1). If the debtor has pledged or assigned nonexempt wages to a
creditor before initiating insolvency proceedings, however, as is quite often the case in
Germany, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text, that assignment is valid for the first
two years of the six-year period. See InsO § 114. In contrast, non-contractual garnishment
proceedings are halted one month after the filing of an insolvency petition. See InsO §
114(3). Therefore, the trustee will receive wages for distribution during the first two years
of the six-year period only if the creditor-assignee is paid in full. See, e.g., RATH, supra note
17, § 6.4.3; BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101, 189. The drafters of the Insolvency Act
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years of the six-year period, the trustee pays the debtor an incentive bonus
of 10% of the debtor's nonexempt wages assigned during the year; the
debtor receives a bonus of 15% of nonexempt income for holding out for
five years.134 At the
35 end of the sixth year, the debtor is released from most
remaining debts. 1
In a rather innovative step, the Insolvency Act enhances the possibility
of payments to creditors136 by demanding the debtor's best efforts to find
and hold a job. Pursuant to "one of the central provisions"' 37 testing the
debtor's six years of "good behavior," the debtor must hold-or actively
seek and not refuse to accept-any suitable employment.138 If the debtor
fails to seek and hold reasonable employment, creditors can petition the
court for denial of discharge. 139 If the debtor remains jobless despite her
best efforts, she does not lose her discharge, but the debtor must exert more
effort to find an acceptable job than simply relying on an employment
agency. 140 Indeed, the drafters emphasized that "reasonableness" in this
context is subject to "intense demands."' 141 The debtor must be ready 1to
42
take on work outside her profession, even temporary work if need be.
For example, a consumer information pamphlet published by the Ministry
of Justice describes a hypothetical consumer insolvency case in which the
debtor, Mr. Honest (HerrRedlich), loses his job as a printer and takes on a
low-wage job as a janitor. 143 The hypothetical story explains that Mr.
admitted that this represents a "considerable position of advantage" for creditors with wage
assignments and pledges. See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101; see also BR-DR. 1/1/92,
supra note 18, at 39.
134 See InsO § 292(1).

135 See id. at § 300. Some debts are not affected by discharge. See id. at § 302. German
law accepts far fewer debts from discharge than U.S. law does, however. Only three types of
debt are not affected by the discharge in Germany: intentional tort liability, monetary fines
and penalties, and the obligation to pay insolvency court costs and fees deferred under InsO
§ 4a. See id. at § 302; cf 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and (7) (2003) (excepting similar debts from
discharge under U.S. bankruptcy law). Under U.S. law, in contrast, a wide variety of
additional debts are not dischargeable, such as recent overdue taxes, past-due child support
and alimony obligations, debts for money or property obtained by fraud, education loan debt,
and liability for bodily injury or death resulting from drunk driving. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(2003). Thus, although the German law demands more from the debtor, it also offers a
broader discharge to the debtor.
136 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 192; DEUTSCHER BUNDESRAT, STENOGRAPHISCHER

BERICHT 639. SITZUNG, supranote 34, at 83.

137 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 192.
131 See InsO § 295(l)(1).
139 See id. at § 296.
140 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 192. BUNDESMINISTERUM FOR JUSTIZ, supra note

126, at 38.
141See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 192.
142 See id.

143 See BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR JUSTIZ, supra note 126, at 30, 34, 38.
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Honest acceted
1
discharge.
a.

the low-wage job "in order not to endanger his

Purpose and Theory of the "Good Behavior Period"

The drafters of the Insolvency Act joined other European nations in
their desire to avoid the U.S. model of consumer insolvency relief, under
which simply undergoing one-time liquidation proceedings leads to
discharge in most cases. 145
The earliest European proposals for
implementing consumer insolvency relief included multi-year payment
periods to ensure that the debtor "exert[s] himself to the fullest to earn the
premium, a discharge of the remainder of the debts.' ' 146 These proposals
suggested a maximum term of four years of payments, so as to avoid
flagging debtor morale and failure of overly long plans. 147 Emerging
European approaches to consumer bankruptcy generally eschew the "getout-of-jail-free" approach of the U.S. system in favor of discharge
conditioned on completion of a several-year payment period. 148 Indeed, it
has been suggested that the "too lenient reputation of U.S. consumer
bankruptcy law makes the word ['bankruptcy'] repugnant to some
Europeans."49
Consistent with the general European attitude, the first legislative
proposal for the German Insolvency Act remarked emphatically that the
"very debtor-friendly" model of Anglo-American law would not be
adopted. 150
Instead, requiring the debtor to assign several years of
nonexempt income and endeavor to obtain and hold suitable employment
would serve a "warning function" to protect the courts from a flood of
frivolous and abusive petitions, ensuring that discharge would be available
only to those debtors ready and willing to give up their garnishable income
and confront the deprivations of seven 5 ' lean years. 5 2 The discharge itself
was designed in part to motivate the debtor "into honest and creditorfriendly behavior."
The drafters explicitly described the discharge as a
''privilege" to be earned by the debtor's accepting any suitable employment

'44Id.at

37.

141See, e.g., BR-DR. 1/92,
146

supra note 8, at 188.
Huls, Towards a EuropeanApproach, supra note 88, at 220, 226-28.

Id. at 221, 228 (noting that four years "seems to be the maximum period for which
consumers are willing and able to expose themselves to the limitations of a plan").
147

148 See Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Changing Directions
in Consumer Bankruptcy Law
and Practicein Europe and USA, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 133, 135 (1997).

149Id.

"s0 BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 100, 188.
11See infra notes 176-85 (regarding the later amendment of this period
to six years).
152 BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 188-89.

113Id.at

188.
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54
and sharing with creditors the burden of unpaid debts.1
In addition, the drafters of the Insolvency Act were influenced by the
writings and economic theories of Thomas Jackson. 155 In his famous
examination of the policies underlying the discharge of debt, for example,
Professor Jackson questioned the economic soundness of ignoring the
valuable property interest in the "human capital" of a consumer debtor's
future earning capacity, as U.S. consumer bankruptcy law generally leaves
only existing, tangible assets available to creditors. 5 6
German
commentators seized on this "inconsistency" in U.S. law, even using
Jackson's terminology of "human capital."' 57 Because credit extensions to
consumers are made not on the basis of present assets, but on the basis of
future earning capacity, these commentators argued that the German
insolvency regime should acknowledge and facilitate the role of future
earnings in the consumer credit bargain and require "liquidation" of at least
part of that "asset" for creditors.1 58 This analysis eventually made its way
into the legislative grounding for the Insolvency Act. Lawmakers designed
the requirement of an extended period of payment from future wages in part
to keep pace with developments in the modem consumer credit economy, in
which future wages play an integral role in the extension of consumer
credit. 5 9

b. Debate about the Length of the Good Behavior Period
The German Parliament never questioned the notion of a multi-year
payment period, but it examined and fiercely debated the length of the
period. When it introduced the bill for the new Insolvency Law, the Kohl
160
Administration chose seven years as the appropriate length of time,
although no one ever offered any explanation for this choice.'
The
Bundesrat Law Committee immediately suggested that the seven-year
period was "unequivocally too long," and proposed a reduction to four

1'4
Id.at 192.
155
See Kamlah, supra note 27, at 421.
156
See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1393, 1431-35 (1985).
157See, e.g., WENZEL, supra note 31, at §§ VII(2)-(3); see also Balz, supra note 23, at
267-69.
158 See id.
159 See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101.
160 See id., at 46, 100, 188.

161See RATH, supra note 17, § 8.1 and note 226.

One member of the original

Commission for Insolvency Law immediately criticized the "arbitrarily seized upon sevenyear period" as "unnecessarily long." See Gerhardt, supra note 32, at 143. He suggested
that the only basis for the choice of seven years is the seventh-year remission of debts in
Deuteronomy 15:1. See id.; see also RATH,supra note 17, § 8.1 note 226.
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years. 16
The Committee suggested that such long "re-socialization"
periods were expected only of criminals. 163 But a majority of the full
Bundesrat re jected this proposal by voice vote without comment or
explanation.1
The Social Democrats 165 continued the fight in the Bundestag, arguing
for a term of as little as three years. In the first consideration of the bill, the
Social Democrats attacked the seven-year period as "in most cases too
long.' ' 166 They admitted that they themselves had proposed a seven-year
period when the idea of a consumer discharge arrived on the legislative
front in 1988, but they had backed away from the longer period based on
reports from debt counseling centers. 167
Consequently, the Social
Democrats filed an alternative proposal 68 based on their finding that "[t]he
practice of the debt counseling centers shows that debt arrangement plans
' 69
with terms of longer than four or five years are predestined to failure."'
Accordingly, the Social Democrats submitted that the good behavior period
should last in normal cases five years, but it could be reduced to three or
raised to 0seven based on the degree of the debtor's fault for finding herself
in debt.17
Rather than reducing the term of the good behavior period, the
Bundestag accepted a committee proposal to boost the debtor's motivation
to complete the seven-year period. The Bundestag Law Committee added
so-called "motivation rebates"'' 1 to be paid to the debtor from nonexempt
income assigned to the trustee. At the end of the fourth, fifth, and sixth

162
163

See BR-DR. 1/1/92, supra note 18, at 39, 54.
See id. at 55.

164 See DEUTSHCER BUNDESRAT, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 639. SITZUNG, supra note
34, at 50-51 (rejecting committee proposals 29 and 44).
165 The Social Democrats generally represent the interests of the working class and trade
unions. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES: GERMANY, Social Democratic
Party of Germany (1995), at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html. As such, they generally
support the consumer perspective most strongly. They "represent the social workers who
understand the problems of poverty." Huls, American Influences, supra note 7, at 134.
166 See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 94. SITZUNG, supra note

334, at 7775.

167 See id.
168

See

ANDERUNGSANTRAG

DER FRAKTION DER

SPD

ZUR ZWEITEN BERATUNG DES

GESETZENTWURFS DER BUNDESREGIERUNG-DRUCKSACHEN 12/2443, 12/7302-ENTWURF
EINER INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INSO), BT-DR. 12/7329 (Apr. 20, 1994), available at http://

www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/showdok.pl?k=BAD 12/7329.
at 4.
170 See id. at 2, 4.
169 Id.

171See BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 51 (using this term, Motivationsrabatt);
GESETZENTWURF DER BUNDESREGIERUNG: ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DER
INSOLVENZORDNUNG UND ANDERER GESETZE, BT-DR. 14/5680, at 41 (Mar. 28, 2001),

availableat http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/056/1405680.pdf.
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years of the period, the debtor would receive "rebates" of 10%, 15%, and
20%, respectively, of her annual assigned nonexempt income. 7 2 The full
Bundestag adopted the Law Committee's approach and rejected the Social
Democrats' proposal. 173 Thus, the law began with a seven-year 74 "good
behavior period," with the debtor's motivation buttressed by rebates of
nonexempt income beginning after four years.
c.

Reduction of Length and Payments Over the Good Behavior Period
Despite continuing harsh criticism and opposition, the lengthy good
behavior period has stubbornly resisted meaningful reform. Demands for a
reduction to five years have continued unheeded. 175 Nevertheless, in
December 2001, the German Parliament ultimately reformed the period in
two less extensive-but still important-ways.
First, the term was finally reduced to six years. In its 2001 reform
proposal, the Administration was unwilling to recommend a reduction in
the seven-year term without further study of the effect of such a reform on
distributions to creditors and on the availability of consumer credit.' 76 An
77
angry reaction quickly ensued from consumer debtor representatives.
They pointed out the lack of any apparent reasoning for the choice of seven
years, and they noted that other European nations had implemented
payment periods of only fouryears. 78 The former Communists, now called
the Democratic Socialists,179 had already taken up the fight in 2000,
introducing a formal proposal to reduce the "good behavior period" to five
80
years to avoid the "demotivation" of the debtor by such a long period.
172 See

BT-DR. 12/7302, supra note 43, at 125, 151, 153, 187-88.

173 See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 222. SITZUNG, supra
note
27, at 19132; GESETZESBESCHLUSS DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES: INSOLVENZORDNUNG

((INsO), BR-DR. 336/94, at 66-67 (Apr. 29, 1994), available at http://
www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/showdok.pl?k=BBD336/94.
174As a transition measure, the period was shortened to five years for those debtors who
were insolvent from January 1, 1997 forward. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, supra
note 126, at 25.
175 See BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 31-32.
176 See id., at 32.
177 See MARIS STARK, ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT SCHULDNERBERATUNG DER VERBANDE,

STELLUNGNAHME

ZUM

GESETZENTWURF

DER

BUNDESREGIERUNG

ZUR

REFORM

DER

INSOLVENZORDNUNG 7-8 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.inso-rechtsprechung.de/
Stellungnahme.pdf.
178See id. at 8.
179 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, GERMANY,

Party of Democratic

Socialism (1995), availableat http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html.
180 See GESETZENTWURF DER ABGEORDNETEN DR. EVELYN KENZLER, ROLF KUTZMUTZ,
DR. GREGOR GYsI UND DER FRAKTION DER PDS, ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG

DER INSOLVENZORDNUNG (INSOANDG), BT-DR. 14/2496, at 1, 3-4 (Jan. 11, 2000), available
at http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/024/1402496.pdf.
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Indeed, the Democratic Socialists and others pointed out that the total
period from the beginning of out-of-court negotiations to the end of the
insolvency case could extend as long as nine to eleven years in some cases
due to delays in the early stages of the process.'18
A middle path once again emerged, as the Bundestag reduced the good
behavior period to six years and tied the beginning of the period to the
opening, rather than the conclusion, of the simplified insolvency
proceedings. 82 It was hoped that these two changes would lead to "a
significant lightening of the burden on debtors," while studies of the
Institute for Financial Services suggested only minimal ill effects for
creditors and the general availability of consumer credit. 83 Achieving even
this minimal reduction in the good behavior period required great effort,
and it 84
was introduced into the bill the night before final committee
debate. 1
The second easing of the burden of the good behavior period is easy to
miss but potentially far more significant. At the same time that it slightly
reduced the term of the good behavior period, the German Parliament
significantly reduced the amount of income that creditors can seize from
debtors, including during the six-year good behavior period.185 Beginning
January 1, 2002, the minimum statutory wage exemption rose nearly 50%
for single debtors and childless couples, which constitute the overwhelming
majority of German households, 186 and between 30% and 40% for debtors
88
with children. 187 Similarly, the maximum exempt amount for all debtors'
See, e.g., MARIUS STARK, supra note 177, at 8; BT-DR. 14/2496, supra note 180, at 4;
at 16091, 16094 (Apr.
5, 2001), available at http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/14/14164.pdf; DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG,
STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 179. SITZUNG, at 17681-82 (Jun. 28, 2001), availableat http://
dip.bundestag.de/btp/14/14179.pdf.
182 See BT-DR. 14/6468, supra note 114, at 1-2, 8, 16, 18. The effective period for prepetition pledges and assignments of wages, see supra note 133, was commensurately
reduced from three to two years to preserve the amount paid to general creditors. See id. at
2, 7, 17. In addition, the 20% "rebate" of the debtor's nonexempt wages at the end of the
sixth year was eliminated. See id. at 9, 18.
183 See BT-DR. 14/6468, supra note 114, at 18.
181

DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 164. SITZUNG,

184 See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 179. SITZUNG, supra note

181, at 17684.

185 Note that the reduction in nonexempt income applies to all debtors, not only those
seeking relief under the Insolvency Act.
186 Households with one or two members make up over 70% of all German households.
See STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT, BEVOLKERUNG, HAUSHALTSTYPEN (Jun. 12, 2003), available

at http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/bevoe/bevoetab Il.htm.
187 See BESCHLUSSEMPFEHLUNG uND BERJCHT DES RECHTSAUSSCHUSSES (6. AusscHuss),

BT-DR. 14/7478, at 4-5 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/074/
1407478.pdf. A detailed table showing the nonexempt amount of wages at various levels is
available from the Ministry of Justice online at http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/1122 l.pdf
(last visited Jul. 14, 2003).
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rose nearly 50%.189 All of these exemption levels will now be reviewed
every two years to keep pace with inflation. 190 Now, applying current
exchange rates,1 91 a childless couple can keep 100% of the first
approximately $17,000 of income, and if they earn more, they can keep a
maximum of about $27,500 per year. 192 This is obviously no king's
ransom, but it is a much more solid foundation for a modest lifestyle.
Consumer debtor advocates praised the resulting "perceptible financial
relief' offered by the long-needed increase. 193 Insolvency advisors and
judges report that, after the increase in exemptions, very few consumer
from the
insolvency cases involve any distribution at all to creditors-either
94
debtor's current assets or from six years of future income.'
C. The Future of German Consumer Insolvency Law
Long waiting periods for debt counseling and difficulties with
financing court costs took their toll on the growth rate of consumer
insolvency cases in the early years, but the numbers recently began to soar.
Approximately 20,000 consumer and small business petitions were filed in
1999,195 the first year of the Insolvency Act. Word evidently spread about
188 See

supra note 48 for an explanation of the significance of this figure and an

explanation of the three-part German wage exemption scheme.
189 See BT-DR. 14/7478, supra note 187, at 5 (reporting an increase from 3796 DM to
5576 DM, or E 2851 per month).
190See id. In the past, exemption levels were revisited only about once a decade. See,
e.g., id. (seventh law increasing exemptions in 2002); BR-DR. 127/92, supra note 47 (sixth
law increasing exemptions in 1992); BR-DR. 32/84, supra note 47 (fifth law increasing
exemptions in 1984).
191The U.S. dollar exchange rate for the euro since its introduction on January 1, 2002,
has risen steadily from just under a dollar per euro in 2002 to a little over a dollar per euro
during 2003. For a historical comparison of the USD/EUR exchange rate, see http://
www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Jul. 14, 2003).
192See http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/1122l.pdf (last visited Jul. 14, 2003) (showing a
100% exemption up to €1289 per month, and £785 attachable of a maximum of £2851 per
month, leaving a maximum of E2066 per month). A single debtor can keep 100% of the first
approximately $12,300 per year, and a percentage of the excess up to a maximum of almost
$20,000 per year. See id. (showing a 100% exemption up to £939 per month, and £1344
attachable of a maximum of £2851 per month, leaving a maximum of E 1507 per month).
193See LANDESARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT

SCHULDNER-UND

INSOLVENZBERATUNG

BERLIN

E.V., RATGEBER FOR BETROFFENE 4 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.schuldnerberatung-

berlin.de/RATGEB.PDF.
194See

AUFRUF

WIEDERHERSTELLUNG

INSOLVENZORDNUNG

DEUTSCHER
DER

(Oct.

INSOLVENZRICHTER

FUNKTIONSFAHIGKEIT

2002),

DER

UND

-RECHTPFLEGER

INSOLVENZGERICHTE

UND
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DER

available at http://www.inso-rechtspfleger.de/inhalt/

01_aktuelles/aufruf202002.htm; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 104, at 76 (reporting that
nearly 100% of the income of debtors in Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania is exempt from
creditors).
195 See BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, § (A)(4).
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196
the financial and procedural difficulties these debtors experienced,
because the number of insolvency petitions filed by individuals fell 40% in
2000.197 Hope for impending reform spurred a 23% resurgence in petitions
in 2001,198 then the consumer insolvency reform of December 2001 raised
the roof. In 2002, consumer and small business insolvency petitions tripled
to over 44,000 petitions.1 99 In the first half of 2003, petitions filed by
consumers are up more than 70% over the same period a year ago.2 °°
Word of mouth about the potential of the new law will undoubtedly
lead to greater interest. For example, one debtor wrote to an internet chatgroup that his first year of the good behavior period was not as bad as he
had expected, that he had no more fear of the next several years, and
"[e]verything is going well for me for the first time in my life. ' '2 1 With
estimates of nearly 2.8 million overindebted households in Germany,20 2 the
well of potential consumer insolvency cases will not run dry for a very long
time.
Reformers have implemented the most substantial changes in
consumer insolvency law already, so they promise no more radical changes
in the future. The Ministry of Justice, the primary mover of insolvency law
reform up to this point, has made its position quite clear: "There will be no
radical about-turn or paradigm shift in consumer insolvency proceedings or
in the discharge. 20 3 The Justice Ministry has already rejected a string of

196 For a discussion of these problems, see, e.g., BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra
note 87, and the sources collected in note 130.
197 See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RUND 41500 INSOLVENZEN IM JAHR 2000 (Mar. 30,
2001), available at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2001i/pl200l32.htm (reporting
approximately 12,000 consumer and small business petitions filed in 2000).
198 See STATISTIscHES BUNDESAMT, KNAPP 50000 INSOLVENZEN IM JAHR 2001 (Mar. 13,
2002), available at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2002/p0860132.htm (reporting

14,749 consumer and small business petitions filed in 2001).
199 See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RUND 37600 UNTERNEHMENSrNSOLVENZEN IM JAHR

2002

(Mar.

21,

2003),

available at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/pm2003/

p1150132.htm (reporting 44,482 insolvency petitions in Germany by private individuals in
2002).
200 See STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT, FAST 20 000 UNTERNEHMENSINSOLVENZEN IM 1.
HALBJAHR 2003 (Sept.19, 2003), available at http://www.destatis.de/presse/deutsch/
pm2003/p3730132.htm (reporting 15,667 petitions by consumers in the first half of 2003, a
70.4% increase over the first half of 2002).
201 See EN JAHR INSO... MEIN LEBEN DANACH... available at http://www.forum-

sculdnerberatung.de (last visited Jul. 15, 2003) (on file with author).
202 See GP-FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE, supra note 11.
STAATSSEKRETARS
PARLAMENTARISCHEN
DES
GRUSSWORT
203 See

BEI

DER

ANLASSLICH DER DAVALFRED HARTENBACH,
DER JUSTIZ,
BUNDESMINISTERIN
IN DEN INSOLVENZVERFAHREN
ZU VERFAHRENSVEREINFACHUNGEN
VERANSTALTUNG
NATURLICHER PERSONEN IN DER DEUTSCHEN ANWALTS AKADEMIE IN BERLIN AM 31. JANUAR

2003 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter BERLIN REDE], available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/ger/
service/reden und interviews/ 10000659/?sid=l 6194b7f842b90dcabb8f7755a205f44.
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alternative reform proposals 20 4 as it recently launched its final foreseeable
reform effort in the area of consumer insolvency.2 °5 It hopes to reduce cost
and alleviate stress on the formal judicial process by facilitating and
enhancing out-of-court debt arrangements.20 6 Only time will tell what
problems will arise in the future. Given the arguments and proposals
presented over the past several years, legislators may be receptive to a
further (and probably final) reduction of the good behavior period to five
years, 207th
although the biennial increase in wage exemption levels may make
such a change unnecessary.
One thing is sure: consumer insolvency relief in the form of a
discharge of unpaid debt is here to stay in Germany. The Ministry of
Justice has expressed its view quite explicitly that Germany needs a judicial
procedure for relieving overindebted individuals.2 8 Overindebtedness is no
longer viewed as a simple result of modern consumer behavior and a "buy
now, pay later" mentality, but rather as a consequence of a complex of
problems, including job-loss, divorce, and illness.20 The Justice Ministry is
quite dedicated to the success of its new consumer debt relief law, whatever
challenges the future reveals.

204 See Guido Stephan, Die Umgestaltung des Einigungsversuchs und weitere
4nderungen im Insolvenzverfahren natiirlicher Personen durch den Diskussionsentwurf
lnsO-A'nderung 2003, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERBRAUCHER-UND PRIVAT-INSOLVENZRECHT, vol.

4, Apr. 30, 2003, at 145, 145, 152.
205See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text; see also Stephan, supra note 204, at
145-52.
206 See,
e.g.,
REDE
DES
PARLAMENTARISCHEN
STAATSSEKRETARS
BEI
DER
BUNDESMINISTERIN DER JUSTIZ, ALFRED HARTENBACH, VOR DEM BERUN-BRANDENBURGERINSOLVENZARBEITSKREIS E.V. ZUM THEMA: "ZWEI JAHRE NEUES INSOLVENZRECHT: EINE

BESTANDSAUFNAHME" AM 26. JuNE 2003 in POTSDAM § IV(5) (Jun. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
POTSDAM REDE], available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/ger/service/reden und-interviews/
10000752/?sid=7ca2del 607209cc69733dcd3496ada88;

DEUTSCHER

BUNDESTAG,

STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 15. WAHLPERIODE, 39. SITZUNG 3191 (Apr. 9, 2003), available

at http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/l5/15039.pdf (remarks of the Parliamentary representative of
the Ministry of Justice noting the elimination of court-directed payment plan proceedings as
the only planned change in consumer insolvency). The Justice Ministry also hopes to attain
several other minor goals in consumer insolvency, such as 1) increasing the usage of the

internet for notice publication, 2) increasing the usage of less costly and less time- and
personnel-intensive written proceedings, and 3) reducing arbitrary judicial requirements not
contained in the law, such as a requirement that the causes of insolvency be explained by the
debtor in writing. See POTSDAM REDE, supra, at § IV(5); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG,
STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 39. SITZUNG, supra, at 3192; BERLIN REDE, supra note 203, at
§ 11(3)-(4).
207 See supra notes 170, 175, 180 (mentioning various calls for a five-year period).
208 See POTSDAM REDE, supra note 206, at § IV.
209 See id.
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IV. POTENTIAL LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
From this survey of German consumer insolvency law and practice, at
least three important lessons emerge for the continuing U.S. debate about
forcing all consumer debtors into a payment plan. Two lessons are obvious
and superficial. The third is non-obvious, perhaps surprising, and probably
more enlightening.
A. The Theory of Required Payment Plans: Universal Agreement on
Requiring Years of Payments to Creditors
One obvious lesson lies on the surface of the legislative history:
Everyone in the legislative process in Germany rejected the "get-out-of-jailfree" approach of U.S. law in favor of requiring several years of payments
to creditors to earn the privilege of a discharge of unpaid debts. No one in
the Administration or Parliament appears to have argued that any subset of
debtors-even those living below the poverty line-should be able to avoid
the multi-year good behavior period with its assignment of all nonexempt
income to creditors.
Indeed, not even the most debtor-friendly and anti-capitalist, anticreditor groups ever suggested that some debtors should receive an
immediate discharge without turning over several years of nonexempt
income. From the outset, the party most closely allied with social workers
and trade unions, the Social Democrats, recommended a payment term of
seven years. 2 10 Even when reports from debt counselors later persuaded the
Social Democrats to back away from this osition, they still proposed a
payment term of at least three years. 2 1
Indeed, even the former
Communists proposed a payment term of five years.21 2 No one could
reasonably accuse the Communists of favoring the capitalist creditor lobby
at the expense of overburdened consumers, yet even they recommended a
multi-year term of required payments to creditors.
It can hardly be argued that a term of required payments in consumer
insolvency cases is so odious as to not merit consideration in the United
States if the ultra-debtor-friendly Social Democrats and former Communists
advocated such plans. To be sure, economic, social, or political conditions
in the United States may militate against imposing multi-year payment
periods on consumer debtors, but the history of the German law suggests
that it should not be considered pro-creditor and anti-debtor simply to
consider such a proposal.

210 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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B. The Simple Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Incentivizing Debtors
The second lesson to be learned from a simple glance at the new
German law is the simple but apparently effective solution to the problem
of "incentivizing" debtors to produce income for distribution to creditors.
U.S. lawmakers in 1978 did not require debtors to attempt to repay any
portion of their debts over time because they feared that debtors would lack
the incentive to complete a period of working "only for the benefit of their
creditors. 213 The German Insolvency Act deftly addresses this problem
with an enticingly simple "carrot-and-stick" solution. The stick threatens a
loss of the privilege of discharge if the debtor fails to find and keep
acceptable employment-even low-prestige, low-wage employment.214 On
the other hand, the carrot promises freedom from debt after six years, as
well as bonus "rebates" of nonexempt income to the debtor for successful
completion of four and five years of the good behavior period.2 15
German law does not revert to a system of "debt peonage," as some
have characterized proposals for mandatory payment terms in the United
States 216 German commentators pointed out that the Insolvency Act does
not force consumers to work to pay off debt, as debt peonage law would;
rather, it allows debtors to obtain a benefit-the discharge of debt-in
exchange for work or serious attempts to find work. As a check on this
significant benefit, it allows creditors to petition for the refusal of financial
relief if the debtor chooses not to work.2 1 If a debtor chooses not to initiate
an insolvency case, creditors are left with the limited remedies of
collections law-creditors cannot force debtors into servitude. This is a
classic balance of benefits and burdens that should not strike reasonable
observers as shocking or problematic, particularly if the requirements are
reasonable, as those imposed by the German law appear to be. Indeed,
creditors can coerce and receive at least the value of the debtor's labor
under a debt peonage system, while most creditors
receive nothing at all
218
under the German consumer insolvency system.
Incidentally, I have found no evidence of the frequency of creditor
petitions for denial of discharge based on debtors' failure to seek or hold
adequate employment. Given that few creditors collect anything during the

213

See generally H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 159 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at

120 (1977).

214 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of

UnconstitutionalConditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165, 167 (1990); H.R. Doc. No. 93-

137, pt. I, at 159 (1973).

See, e.g., WENZEL, supra note 31, at § VII(3).
218 See infra Part IV.C.
217
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good behavior period in any event, 2 19 one suspects that few creditors would
be willing to invest in monitoring debtors' employment-seeking activity
over six years.
C. The Reality of Required Payment Plans: Creditors Do Not Receive
Payments from Asset Liquidation or from Several Years of Nonexempt
Income
A little digging into the implementation of the law reveals a surprising
and probably more enlightening lesson. The notion of six or seven years of
payments to creditors from nonexempt income is largely an illusion. The
"equal distributions to creditors" theme applies in principal but not in
practice. Virtually no consumer debtor pays anything to creditors during
the good behavior period because the wage exemption now protects all of
most debtors' income. The good behavior period in reality is reduced to a
psychological device to impress upon the debtor the notion of shouldering
the burden of unpaid debts in order to earn the privilege of a discharge.
Indeed, legislators were prepared from the beginning for creditors to
receive nothing or nearly nothing in most consumer cases. The German
Parliament soundly rejected early proposals to require a minimum dividend
to creditors in consumer cases. Just over a year before the new Insolvency
Law went into effect, representatives of several of the German Lander
introduced a proposal to amend the law to require a minimum dividend of
10% of creditors' claims, as the Austrian insolvency law does. 220 These
Lander argued that the discharge offered only a psychological benefit, but
no economic solution, to debtors with no income or assets in excess of
legally protected limits. 221 Such debtors, it was argued, "generally have
nothing to fear from their creditors., 222 Proponents of a minimum dividend
further argued that offering the benefits of discharge to such consumers
ignored the "main goal" of the law-the best-possible distribution to
creditors-and was "inconsistent with the 'strict prerequisites for the
awarding of the discharge' set out by the legislature. 2
The Lander
219 See supra note 194.
220 See GESETZESANTRAG DER LANDER BAYERN, NIEDERSACHSEN,
SAARLAND, SACHSEN, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN:

RHEINLAND-PFALZ,

ENTWURF EtNES GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DER

INSOLVENZORDNUNG UND ANDERER GESETZE, BR-DR. 783/97, at 3-4, 7-8, 10-17 (Oct. 13,

1997),
available
at
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.de/cgi-bin/hyperdoc/
show dok.pl?k=BBD783/97.
22! See id. at 7-8. This argument, of course, ignores the fact that such debtors
have no
incentive to improve their economic situations, for fear that any improvement will pass

immediately to creditors. This was the situation of debtors under the former East German
Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung,described supra note 31, which was explicitly rejected as a
model for consumer insolvency relief in the new unified Germany.
222 Id. at 8.
223 See id. at 11.
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proposal died immediately. It was never even reported out of committee.
Any requirement that consumers pay any portion of their debts through the
good behavior period was soundly rejected in Parliament.224 In rejecting
any requirement of minimum dividend to creditors, German law decisively
followed early European consumer debt relief proposals, which also
allowed for zero-payment
plans so long as this represented the debtor's
225
"best efforts."
The majority of courts also rejected early attempts to demand
minimum payments from debtors in the court-directed debt arrangement
plan stage. Debtors with no nonexempt income and no seizable assets have
little incentive to offer creditors any payment, so many debtors in the incourt plan negotiation stage proposed plans paying little or nothing to
creditors. After a short period in early 1999 in which several courts rejected
such so-called "zero plans," the majority of lower courts, and all appellate
courts of the Lander that dealt with this issue, concluded that so-called
"zero plans" should be allowed.226 It will soon be a moot issue whether
"zero plans" are acceptable in the court-directed debt arrangement stage, as
227
But the jurisprudence further
that stage is poised for elimination.
confirms that German consumer insolvency cases often involve no actual
payments to creditors-and both the legislature and the courts accept this.
The prominence of zero-payment insolvency cases in Germany casts
significant doubt on the possibility that U.S. creditors would receive any
economic benefit from requiring payment plans in U.S. consumer
bankruptcy law.
A wide variety of statistics suggest that few U.S.
consumer debtors
would
be able to pay anything to creditors over a term of
2 28
several years.
Indeed, even less payment could be reasonably expected of U.S.
224 Apparently, another "minimum dividend" proposal was intensively discussed and
firmly rejected in 1998, although I have found no documentary record of this debate, only
reference to such a discussion preceding a 1998 law amending portions of another
bankruptcy-related law. See, e.g., Pape, supra note 87, at 2042-43 (arguing that, with this
1998 debate, "the last doubts were removed that lawmakers consciously did not introduce a
minimum dividend").
225 See Huls, Towards a European Approach, supra note 88, at 227-28.
226 See BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, § (B)(I)(3)(b); Vallender, supra

note 89, at 128; Pape, supra note 87, at 2042-43;

HERGENRODER,

IV(2)(a)(bb);

available at http:// www.forum-

see also NULLPLAN-ENTSCHEIDUNGEN,

supra note 18, §

schuldnerberatung.de (last visited Jul. 16, 2003) (on file with author) (listing court decisions
upholding and rejecting zero-payment plans).
227 See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means Testing, 1999
B.Y.U.L. REV. 177, 186-92 (1999); Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J.
1079, 1081-1100 (1998); ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONER'S
ABILITY TO REPAY:

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM BANKRUPTCY PETITION FILES (1998),

available at http://www.abiworld.org/consumer/emst/emst.html.

The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief
24:257 (2004)
debtors than is expected of German debtors given two major distinctions
between U.S. and German law: state-sponsored social welfare benefits and
wage exemption levels. Unlike U.S. debtors, German debtors need not use
large portions of their income to cover health care and other common costs,
as Germany provides relatively generous national health insurance,
education, and other social welfare benefits. 229 Furthermore, lower-income
Germans can shield much more of their income from creditors than their
U.S. counterparts. After the substantial increase in the German wage
exemption level in 2002, available reports indicate that very little of the
income of German debtors is subject to distribution to creditors. 210 A
childless couple in Germany enjoys a 100% exemption in approximately
23 1
$17,000
and that minimum 100% exemption grows if the couple
has " per year,
132
has children.
In contrast, a U.S. couple with no children or ten children is
generally subject to the same minimum exemption of just over $8,000 per
year. 233 A U.S. debtor would have to make $22,667 to keep the same
minimum $17,000 as her German counterpart.2 34 The U.S. wage exemption
scheme is far more favorable to higher income levels than the German
scheme,235 but low income is precisely the problem for most overindebted
consumers. The plain fact is that consumer debtors do not pay because they
cannot pay, not because they do not want to. The German experience
further confirms this.
With relatively low wage exemptions and welfare benefits, U.S.
consumers are generally more susceptible to economic volatility. Generous
state welfare benefits and a relatively high wage exemption offer German
debtors a substantial chance for successful completion of the six-year good
behavior period. U.S. debtors are less likely than Germans to be able to
complete such a multi-year payment term. This conclusion is borne out by
229

See, e.g.,

U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 2, Social Welfare, Health Care, and

Education.

230 See supra note 194.

See supra note 192.
232 See supra note 48 (describing the three-stage German wage exemption scheme).
231

233 In most states, the greater of 75% of weekly after-tax earnings or 30 times minimum
wage is exempt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1672-73 (2000). Given that the minimum wage is
currently $5.15 per hour, see 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2003), this leaves a minimum annual
exemption of $8034, regardless of how many dependent obligations the debtor might have.
State law can offer greater protection, but few states do. See, e.g., SUMMARY OF COLLECTION
LAWS, at http://summary.users1.50megs.com (last visited July 16, 2003) (listing garnishment
protections in the various states).
234 U.S. law exempts 75% of income higher than minimum wage, and $17,000 is
75% of
$22,667. See id.
235 The U.S. wage exemption law contains no maximum wage beyond which all income
is seizable, as the German law does, and U.S. law exempts 75% of wages higher than the
minimum, while German law protects only 30% of excess wages for individual debtors, and
50%-90% for debtors with between one and five dependents. See supra note 49.
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the high failure rate of consumer payment plans under Chapter 13 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.236
V.

IF THEY CAN'T PAY, WHAT'S THE POINT? THE MOST IMPORTANT
LESSON

The consumer provisions of the German Insolvency Act received the
following hearty praise from Alfred Hartenbach, a Social Democratic
member of the Bundestag who, incidentally, served as a judge presiding
over bankruptcy cases between 1985 and 1994:
The people get something from it, as their feeling of self-worth rises.
The children of these people get something from it, as it must be, I
believe, one of the worst experiences when one must grow up in an
overindebted household as a child in poverty. The cities and
communities get something from it, because they have to pay fewer
social welfare benefits. The Ldnder and the Federation also get
something from it, because taxes will be collected
237 again. Thus, we
have created an all-around reasonable law here.
A benefit for creditors is conspicuously absent from this acclaim for
the Insolvency Act. German lawmakers have created an impressive set of
theoretical benefits and trade-offs, which demands a carefully balanced quid
pro quo of debtors and creditors affected by consumer bankruptcy. But the
real "quids" and the real "quos" prove a bit imbalanced upon closer
inspection under the lens of actual practice.
At least theoretically, consumer debtors give up any valuable
nonexempt property, as well as six years of nonexempt future income.
Perhaps more importantly from a social-responsibility perspective, debtors
sacrifice the uninhibited right to choose whether to work and what job to
take on-they are forced to acknowledge that others depend on their
responsible attitude toward producing income. Even if this income is
insufficient to produce any return to creditors, the law impresses on debtors
a strong sense of responsibility for dealing with their financial affairs. No
one is forced to work, of course, but if debtors want the "quo" of the highly
beneficial discharge of unpaid debt, they must offer the "quid" of at least a
responsible attempt at creating income for settlement of debt.
Despite what appears to be a rather creditor-friendly consumer
insolvency system, most creditors get the short end of the stick in Germany.
236 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy:

One Code, Many

Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 535 (1993) (citing failures in between 35% and 80% of
confirmed Chapter 13 plans); THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
217 (1989) (citing plan failure in 70% of Chapter 13 cases).
237 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHER BERICHT, 179. SITZUNG, supra note 181,

at 17685.
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The law offers the potential benefit of squeezing six years of payments out
of debtors, but this benefit is largely illusory. Theoretically, without a
system of consumer debt relief, creditors would receive nothing, as most
property is exempt from creditors outside the insolvency system as well,
and debtors with non-exempt income would simply go "underground,"
hiding their non-exempt income from creditors, or refusing to work at all.
Therefore, creditors should benefit when the Insolvency Act goads debtors
into working to turn over at least six years of nonexempt income. Of
course, German legislators robbed from Peter to pay Paul, as they increased
the wage exemption levels beyond the average debtor's total earnings. In
the great majority of cases, the "quid" of requiring creditors to give up their
unpaid debts after six years is not met with a "quo" of any payments of
nonexempt income during that time. While the German model of requiring
payment from every consumer debtor looks favorable to creditors on paper,
the reality of the situation is that German creditors generally receive little
more with required payment plans than U.S. creditors do without them.
The major practical distinction between German and U.S. consumer
insolvency law appears to be the potential for inculcating financial
responsibility in current and potential debtors. U.S. consumer bankruptcy
law generally produces the same economic balance as the German law, as
debtors give up nothing more than filing fees, and creditors receive no
distribution in the great majority of bankruptcy cases. But the U.S. system
appears to have very little interest in controlling debtors' future financial
behavior.23 8 U.S. law currently does not require any sort of credit
counseling, it does not require debtors to attempt to reach a compromise
with creditors, and it generally does not place any burdens on debtors
beyond the conclusion of a brief liquidation case. German law, in contrast,
requires debtors to seek the advice of an identified "suitable person or
agency," which generally turns out to be a state-sponsored debt counselor.
Debtors will almost assuredly receive some sort of counseling here, at least
in developing a manageable budget to serve as the basis of an offer in
compromise to creditors. Then, German debtors must at least seek a
compromise with creditors before initiating formal debt relief proceedings.
Finally, German debtors are reminded of their duty to work to address their
financial responsibilities for six years, even if the reality is that they are not
required actually to pay much if anything toward their unpaid debts.
Whether or not counseling and other efforts to impress financial
responsibility upon consumer debtors are valuable or effective is certainly
debatable, but the German legislature has concluded after serious
238 But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(8) and (9) (2003), making relief unavailable to debtors
who find their way back into financial trouble within six years of a consumer bankruptcy
case, and depriving consumers of repeat relief in cases of certain types of misfeasance with
respect to property and information pertaining to property.
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consideration that these efforts are of some value-even if some minimal
impact on the level of consumer debtors' financial responsibility is the only
benefit offered to creditors and society.
On the other hand, the German experience with consumer bankruptcy
suggests that creditors would receive very little direct benefit if more
debtors were forced into Chapter 13 plans in the United States. Most
consumers will be unable to offer anything to creditors, even over an
extended period.
U.S. lawmakers and courts, like their German
counterparts, must be prepared for such an outcome.
But subjecting debtors to a reasonableregime of required attempts to
find work and offer creditors any excess over sufficient protected wages
over a limited period of time may produce some indirect benefits. In the
United States, like in Germany, forcing debtors to undergo a "good
behavior period" will likely amount to no more than a psychological
exercise in inculcating some sense of financial responsibility. This may or
may not be worth the effort, but proponents of forced payment plans should
realize that the German system achieves little more than this. Proponents of
forced payment plans in the United States must first acknowledge, however,
that German law protects a minimal level of existence much better than
does current U.S. law. Against the backdrop of legislation providing for
social welfare and wage garnishment restrictions, the German system
requiring six years of modest garnishment is decidedly not comparable to
forcing debtors into a Chapter 13 plan in the United States. An increase in
the amount of income exempt from creditor seizure is, in my view, an
absolute necessity before the United States can consider an approach like
that adopted in Germany.
The German word for the six-year payment period turns out to be quite
telling. The notion of the Wohlverhaltensperiode, or "good behavior
period," is much more concerned in reality with the debtor's
"resocialization" and re-entry into the open credit economy 239 than with
ensuring any dividend to creditors. In economic terms, the German system
is also "very debtor friendly." The German system simply makes more
effort to force debtors to take responsibility, negotiate with creditors, and
reflect at length on their financial duties.
One of the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm describes the path to
heaven. In response to a prince's question about how to get to heaven, a
poor old man responds, "By poverty and humility ... Put on my tattered
clothes, wander about the world for seven years, and learn all about its
misery .... This is how you'll find the way to heaven., 240 The German
Cf Margaret Howard, A Theory of Dischargein Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047 (1987) (theorizing that facilitating consumer debtors' re-entry into the open credit
economy is a primary goal of the discharge in U.S. bankruptcy law).
240 See Jacob & Wilhelm Grimm, Poverty and Humility Lead to Heaven, in THE
239
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Insolvency Act proposes a similar path to deliverance from debt. "Good
behavior" will set one free, but it is not as important how one acts to benefit
others as it is that one reflects and learns about oneself and about one's
responsibilities. Putting debtors back on the path of "righteous" financial
behavior is potentially more valuable to society than offering a few
creditors a narrow benefit at the expense of both the debtor and society.
Getting debtors back on that path without overburdening them with
unattainable economic demands is the trick. In my view, this is the most
important lesson that German consumer insolvency law has to teach the
United States.

COMPLETE FAIRY TALES OF THE BROTHERS GRIMM 638 (Jack Zipes trans., 1987).
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